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Rethinking Standing in Patent Challenges
Michael J. Burstein*

ABSTRACT

Patents have become a serious business risk. They issue from the Patent
and Trademark Office in record-breaking quantity and are aggressively enforced by patent trolls. But many patents are likely to be invalid; and even
those which are valid are likely to be narrower than their owners claim. Firms
investing in innovation would find it desirable to clear their respective fields of
invalid or overbroad patents prior to making their investments, and there is.
great social value in reducing the number of such patents. But the path to
determining the validity or scope of issued patents runs through the courts,
and in recent years the Federal Circuit has developed special standing rules for
patent challengers that allow access to the courts only when it appears that an
infringement suit is temporally or legally proximate. In this Article, I criticize
this "proximity" criterion on conceptual, doctrinal, and normative grounds
and provide a comprehensive account of standing to challenge the scope and
validity of patents. Conceptually, I argue that because patents are a form of
regulation, their effects sweep more broadly than the Federal Circuit currently
appreciates. When the risk of infringement liability deters business and investment activities, the affected parties can bring a "quiet title" action to obtain
certainty about the validity or scope of adverse patents. I then argue as a
doctrinal matter that there is no reason to treat patent challenges differently
from other cases. Applying traditional principles of constitutional and prudential standing broadens the range of potential plaintiffs. Finally, I justify
this result on normative grounds because the Federal Circuit's restrictive approach creates a misalignment between those who have incentives to challenge
patents and those who have access to the courts. Allowing challenges by a
broader range of plaintiffs will result in more socially valuable validity
litigation.
* Associate Professor of Law, Cardozo School of Law. I thank Michelle Adams, Shyam
Balganesh, Yochai Benkler, Richard Bierschbach, Dan Burk, Kevin Collins, Rochelle Dreyfuss,
John Duffy, Brett Frischmann, Myriam Gilles, Mark McKenna, Irina Manta, Arti Rai, Dan
Ravicher, Pam Samuelson, Stewart Sterk, Alex Stein, Susannah Tobin, Rebecca Tushnet, and
Melissa Wasserman for helpful comments and conversations. I am also grateful to participants
at the Fifth Annual Junior Scholars in IP Workshop at Michigan State, the "IP Meets the Constitution" Roundtable at Columbia Law School, the 2013 Works in Progress Intellectual Property
Conference, the 2013 NYU Tri-State Intellectual Property Workshop, the 2011 IP Scholars Conference, and workshops at Hofstra and Illinois for valuable discussion. Sophie Solomon, Kayla
Robinson, Lindsay Korotkin, Danielle Shultz, and Rachel Sachs provided outstanding research
assistance. By way of full disclosure, I served as counsel to groups of intellectual property
professors as amici curiae in Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721 (2013), and Organic Seed
Growers & Trade Ass'n v. Monsanto Co., 718 F.3d 1350, 1357-58 (Fed. Cir. 2013). The views
expressed in this Article are mine alone.
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INTRODUCTION

Patents have become a serious business risk. They are produced
in greater quantities than ever before. 1 A whole industry based upon
threats of patent enforcement-the infamous patent trolls-has
sprung up, leading to a surge in intellectual property litigation. 2 And
a judgment of infringement can have devastating effects for a business, subjecting it to crippling damages and an injunction against continuing any infringing operations. 3 A great many of the patents that
are issued and litigated are invalid; and even more are of uncertain
1 In fiscal year 2013, the United States Patent & Trademark Office ("PTO") issued over
265,000 utility patents. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND Ac.
COUNTABILITY REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2013, at 192 tbl.6. Even just ten years ago, in 2003, the
PTO issued just over 171,000. See id.
2 The literature on patent trolls is large and growing. For an overview, see Colleen V.
Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem and Its Implications for
the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297 (2010); Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 CoLuM. L. REv. 2117 (2013); Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths ,
42 SETON HALL L. REV. 457 (2012).
3 See 35 U .S.C. § 284 (2012) (authorizing up to treble damages in certain cases of patent
infringement); id. § 283 (authorizing injunctive relief for patent infringement).
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scope, particularly in the software industry. But it is very difficult to
predict the validity or scope of an issued patent prior to litigation. 4 So
what is a business facing this risk to do in planning its activities? Innovation, after all, takes time and money; investments in innovation
often must be made well before new products or processes actually
see the light of day. An innovative company often may face an impossible choice. It must either make fixed investments despite the risk
that those investments can be held up later through patent litigation,
or it must steer clear of any possibly infringing activity no matter how
weak an adverse patent claim may be.
If this hypothetical business were a real estate developer uncertain about whether it was authorized to build on a parcel of land,
there would be an obvious third choice: it could resolve the uncertainty through a quiet title action. 5 But in recent years the Federal
Circuit has developed a set of standing rules that prevents most developers of intellectual property, rather than real property, from bringing
such an action. Instead of making the familiar inquiry into standingwhether a plaintiff has been injured in fact, by the defendant, in a
manner redressable by a favorable judicial ruling6-the Federal Circuit inquires into the temporal and legal proximity of an infringement
suit.7 A plaintiff can "quiet title" as to the validity or scope of a patent only if she is likely to be sued for infringement-that is, if she has
come close to infringing and the defendant has signaled a willingness
to assert the patent.
This Article critiques these standing rules on conceptual, doctrinal, and normative grounds. It argues that the Federal Circuit has
misconceived the injury that arises from even the mere existence of a
patent, has crafted patent-specific standing rules that are more restrictive than those called for under the Supreme Court's broader standing
precedents, and has created a misalignment between those who have
the incentive to challenge patents and those who have standing to do
so. The result is fewer and lower quality challenges8 than may be
optimal.
4 Issued patents enjoy a presumption of validity, but courts retain authority finally to
adjudicate that issue. See id. § 282(a) ("A patent shall be presumed valid."); Microsoft Corp. v.
i4i Ltd. P'Ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011) (requiring proof of invalidity by clear and convincing
evidence).
5 See, e.g., 28 U .S.C. § 2409a (2012).
6 See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U .S. 555, 560 (1992).
7 See infra Part I.
8 I use the term "patent challenges" throughout this Article to refer to both declaratory
judgment suits and administrative proceedings, and to refer to both invalidity and noninfringe-
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Standing to sue has not until recently been a significant issue in
patent litigation. In the typical case, a patent holder files suit against
an accused infringer. The infringement defendant, in turn, can assert
as a defense that the patent is invalid and can seek, by way of counterclaim, a declaratory judgment voiding the patent. 9 In this posture,
there is no question that the infringement defendant has standing to
challenge the validity of the patent that is being asserted against her.
Her counterclaim is part and parcel of the same "[c)ase[ ]" or
"[c]ontrovers[y]" that arose when she was sued for infringement.1°
As patents and patent litigation have proliferated, however,
proactive actions seeking to invalidate or narrow patents have become
more common. Indeed, Congress acknowledged the importance of
more and better mechanisms for weeding out invalid intellectual property when it enacted new patent review procedures as part of the
America Invents Act ("AIA"). 11 Challenges to a patent's scope or
validity may take two forms, but both require access to the courts.
The first is a declaratory judgment action filed in the district court.
Although in the past these actions were usually brought only by licensees or infringement defendants seeking a favorable forum, groups
such as the ACLU, the Public Patent Foundation, and the Electronic
Frontier Foundation are adopting a public interest model of patent
litigation reminiscent of that found in civil rights or environmental
law. 12 The most prominent example of this litigation model is the
challenge to the validity of breast cancer gene patents in Ass'n for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. 13
The second type of validity challenge is an appeal from administrative post-grant review proceedings. Through the new AIA procedures, any "person who is not the owner of a patent" may file a
petition with the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office ("PTO") "to cancel
ment grounds. For the most part, the standing concerns are the same as between challenges to a
patent's validity and to its scope. See infra Part III.C.
9 See 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(2)-(3) (2012). A judicial finding that a patent is invalid has
preclusive effect in subsequent litigation. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found.,
402 U.S. 313, 333-34 (1971).
10 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
11 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 6, 125 Stat. 284, 299-313
(2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.); Joe Mata!, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part II of II, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 539, 600--05 (2012)
(collecting legislative history of post-grant review provisions).
12 See Megan M. La Belle, Patent Law as Public Law, 20 GEo. MAsoN L. REv. 41, 41-45
(2012) (analogizing such actions to the public law litigation model described in Abram Chayes,
The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281 (1976)).
13 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
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as unpatentable [one] or more claims of a patent." 14 But those agency
proceedings are not final. Any party, including the challenger, may
appeal the agency's determination in federal court. 15 And the Federal
Circuit recently concluded that its standing rules apply both to declaratory judgments and to agency appeals. 16
As judicial and administrative validity challenges become important mechanisms to weed out invalid intellectual property and to
check the behavior of patent trolls, standing is being litigated with increasing frequency. 17 Indeed, aspects of intellectual property standing
appeared on the Supreme Court's docket twice in the 2012 Term-in
Myriad, the gene patents case, and in Already, LLC v. Nike Inc., 18 a
trademark case. Neither case definitively resolved the issue. 19 Standing questions therefore continue to vex courts and litigants in patent
challenges.
This Article offers the first comprehensive treatment of standing
to challenge the validity or scope of patents. It makes three contributions. First, I develop a conceptual account of the injury that may
arise from the existence of intellectual property. 20 Intellectual property rights are rights in rem. They purport to exclude the world from
the subject matter they cover. As such, they regulate the primary be35 U.S.C. §§ 311(a)-(b), 321(a)-(b) (2012).
See id. §§ 319, 329.
16 See Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 753 F.3d 1258, 1261--62 (Fed.
Cir. 2014) (requiring underlying injury in fact separate and distinct from loss before the agency
for standing), cert. denied, 2015 WL 731871 (U.S. Feb. 23, 2015).
17 In 2012 and 2013, the Federal Circuit issued eight decisions on declaratory judgment
jurisdiction in patent cases. See Cisco Sys., Inc. v. Alta. Telecomms. Research Ctr., 538 F. App'x
894 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass'n v. Monsanto Co., 718 F.3d 1350 (Fed.
Cir. 2013); Arkema Inc. v. Honeywell Int'), Inc., 706 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Fox Grp., Inc. v.
Cree, Inc., 700 F.3d 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Matthews Int'! Corp. v. Biosafe Eng'g, LLC, 695 F.3d
1322 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Dey Pharma, LP v. Sunovion Pharm. Inc., 677 F.3d 1158 (Fed. Cir. 2012);
3M Co. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 673 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Streck, Inc. v. Research &
Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 665 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
1s Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721 (2013).
19 In Already, the Court considered an issue common to patent and trademark litigation:
whether a covenant not to sue for past or present infringing activity mooted a declaratory judgment action when the plaintiff alleged a continued risk of future injury. See id. at 725. The
Court, however, construed the relevant covenant to include future activity, avoiding the question
whether a risk of infringement liability was sufficient for standing. See id. at 728-29. Although
the standing issue was contested in Myriad, the Court affirmed the Federal Circuit's finding that
at least one plaintiff had standing in a brief footnote with little reasoning. See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2115 n.3 (2013).
20 See infra Part II. Megan La Belle analogizes patent litigation to traditional public law
litigation. See La Belle, supra note 12. Although La Belle argues for expanded standing on that
ground, see id. at 92-93, she does not engage the question how intellectual property results in
Article III injury.
14

15
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havior of those in the relevant field. When patents are of uncertain
validity or scope, their mere presence creates risk and uncertainty that
deters productive investments. This risk itself is an injury. It prevents
people from engaging in conduct that, if the intellectual property were
invalid, they otherwise would be entitled to undertake.
Second, I situate the problem of intellectual property standing
within the broader doctrinal context of the Supreme Court's constitutional and prudential standing jurisprudence. 21 I argue that there is
nothing about intellectual property that justifies the development of
special rules that depart from the Supreme Court's general principles.
The Court recognizes in a variety of contexts that the risk or uncertainty of regulation can give rise to standing so long as a judicial determination reduces or eliminates the risk or uncertainty. Patent
challenges fit easily into these precedents and their underlying normative commitments. Patent challenges also are justified on well-established prudential grounds.
Finally, I make the normative argument not only that broader
standing will produce more validity challenges, but also that a return
to classic standing principles will remedy a misalignment between
those who can bring intellectual property validity challenges and those
who have the incentive to do so. 22 Direct competitors, the preferred
plaintiffs under current rules, often have an individual incentive to expend time and money on validity litigation that does not align with
that of other competitors or society as a whole. They bring fewer validity challenges on narrower grounds than might other plaintiffs such
as indirect or potential competitors. Allowing challenges from both
21 See infra Part III. Several scholars have suggested fixes to the discretionary factors
applied in declaratory judgment cases. See Lorelei Ritchie de Larena, Re-evaluating Declaratory
Judgment Jurisdiction in Intellectual Property Disputes, 83 IND. L.J. 957, 987-89 (2008); Lisa A.
Dolak, Power or Prudence: Toward a Better Standard for Evaluating Patent Litigants' Access to
the Declaratory Judgment Remedy, 41 U.S.F. L. REv. 407, 432-34 (2007). To my knowledge, this
Article is the first to address the constitutional and prudential status of patent challenges, and
the first to do so across the full range of procedural postures.
22 See infra Part IV. Others have articulated a variety of reasons why expanded standing
might be good policy, but have not expressly linked standing to the incentive to bring validity
challenges. See La Belle, supra note 12, at 92-93 (arguing for rules that encourage challenges
based on public policy concerns); Nicholas D. Walrath, Note, Expanding Standing in Patent Declaratory Judgment Actions to Better Air Public Policy Considerations, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 476,
480-81 (2013) (same); see also Chester S. Chuang, Unjust Patents & Bargaining Breakdown:
When Is Declaratory Relief Needed?, 64 S.M.U. L. REv. 895, 897-98 (2011) (arguing that declaratory relief should be more readily available for vague patent claims); Kali N. Murray, Rules for
Radicals: A Politics of Patent Law, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 63, 77-81 (2006) (arguing for broad
standing to allow multiple stakeholders to shape patent policy).
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actual and potential competitors to proceed in court would therefore
enhance the social value of patent litigation.
I.

THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S "PROXIMITY" STANDARD

Most of the law concerning the justiciability of patent challenges
has been developed in the context of declaratory judgment actions.
The Declaratory Judgment Act provides that "[i]n a case of actual
controversy within its jurisdiction . . . any court of the United
States ... may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration. "23 The Supreme Court has long
held that the "case of actual controversy" language in the statute incorporates Article Ill's strictures on federal jurisdiction.24 So actions
brought under the Declaratory Judgment Act are subject to the same
justiciability analysis as any other actions. 25 They still must satisfy the
requirements of standing, mootness, and ripeness.
One of the original uses of the Declaratory Judgment Act was to
seek a declaration that intellectual property was invalid.26 That particular use remains common. Prior to 2007, the Federal Circuit articulated and consistently applied a two-part test for determining whether
a court had jurisdiction to hear a claim under the Declaratory Judgment Act that a patent was invalid. 27 For jurisdiction to be proper, the
court required "both (1) an explicit threat or other action by the patentee, which creates a reasonable apprehension on the part of the declaratory plaintiff that it will face an infringement suit, and (2) present
activity which could constitute infringement or concrete steps taken
with the intent to conduct such activity." 28 The court was rarely clear
about the rationale for this test. Its reasoning seemed to be simply
that an "actual controversy" under the Declaratory Judgment Act was
necessary for the exercise of Article III jurisdiction, and the two-part
28 U .S.C. § 2201(a) (2012).
See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U .S. 227, 239-40 (1937).
25 See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U .S. 1, 17
(1983) (" (T]he Declaratory Judgment Act was intended to affect only the remedies available in a
federal district court, not the court's jurisdiction .... ").
26 See EDWIN Bo RCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 803-04 (2d ed. 1941).
27 See, e.g., Microchip Tech. Inc. v. Chamberlain Grp. , Inc., 441 F.3d 936, 942 (Fed. Cir.
2006); Medimmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 427 F.3d 958, 964 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev'd, 549 U .S.
118 (2007); Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 395 F.3d 1324, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2005); GenProbe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Chase
Packaging Corp., 57 F.3d 1054, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1995); BP Chems. Ltd. v. Union Carbide Corp., 4
F.3d 975, 978 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731,
736 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
2s BP Chems., 4 F.3d at 978.
23

24
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test could be used to determine whether such an "actual controversy"
existed. 29 The court explained that there was no controversy unless
the defendant expressed an "intent to enforce its patent" and the
plaintiff had "a true interest to be protected by the declaratory judgment."30 In the court's view, it seems, there was only an "actual controversy" when there was "an underlying legal cause of action that the
declaratory defendant could have brought or threatened to bring, if
not for the fact that the declaratory plaintiff ha[d] preempted it." 31
Only, therefore, when a declaratory plaintiff could have been the defendant in an infringement suit was she allowed first to file a declaratory judgment action.
The Federal Circuit viewed its test as a constitutional requirement for jurisdiction. 32 It therefore applied that test across a wide
range of fact patterns and procedural postures. The most straightforward were instances where the declaratory judgment was sought as a
counterclaim in an infringement suit. In that circumstance, the "reasonable apprehension" of suit had already matured into an actual suit,
and so the test was satisfied. 33 But the court also held that even after a
suit was filed, the patent holder could unilaterally divest the court of
jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment counterclaim by moving to
dismiss the original infringement action and making a covenant not to
sue again over the defendant's then-existing products or conduct. 34
The court held that licensees were never in reasonable apprehension
of suit so long as they continued to make royalty payments and did
not breach their licenses; the license agreement "obliterate[s] any rea29 See, e.g. , Teva Pharm., 395 F.3d at 1331-32 ("The [Declaratory Judgment] Act, which
parallels Article III of the Constitution, requires an actual controversy between the parties
before a federal court may exercise jurisdiction . ... This court has developed a two-part inquiry
to determine whether there is an actual controversy in a suit requesting a declaration of patent
non-infringement or invalidity.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Gen-Probe,
359 F.3d at 1379-80; Arrowhead, 846 F.2d at 735-36.
30 Arrowhead, 846 F.2d at 736.
31 Microchip Tech., 441 F.3d at 943.
32 See, e.g., Medimmune, 427 F.3d at 964-65; Teva Pharm., 395 F.3d at 1335; Dolak, supra
note 21 , at 423-24.
·
33 See Arrowhead, 846 F.2d at 736 ("If defendant has expressly charged a current activity
of the plaintiff as an infringement, there is clearly an actual controversy, certainty has rendered
apprehension irrelevant, and one need say no more.").
· 34 See Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Chase Packaging Corp., 57 F.3d 1054, 1058 (Fed. Cir.
1995). Indeed, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Cardinal Chemical Co. v. Morton International, Inc., 508 U.S. 83 (1993), the Federal Circuit consistently held that affirmance of a judgment of noninfringement justified vacating a declaratory judgment of invalidity because "the
finding of noninfrginement has entirely resolved the controversy between the litigants by resolving the initial complaint brought by the patentee." Id. at 91-92. The Supreme Court rejected
this practice and its rationale. See infra notes 37-45 and accompanying text.
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sonable apprehension" that the licensee will be sued for infringement.35 As to parties without a preexisting relationship, the court
developed a fact-specific jurisprudence about what constitutes sufficient threats of litigation to place a declaratory judgment plaintiff in
"reasonable apprehension of suit. " 36
The Supreme Court rejected the "reasonable apprehension of
suit" test in Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. 37 In that case, the
plaintiff Medlmmune was a licensee of the defendant Genentech. 38
When a dispute over whether a patent was covered by the license
arose, Medlmmune continued to pay the demanded royalties-it was
unwilling to risk the possibility of treble damages and an injunction
against selling a product that accounted for more than 80 percent of
its revenue in an infringement action39-but also brought a declaratory judgment to invalidate Genentech's patent. 40 The Federal Circuit
held that the courts lacked jurisdiction over the action because, so
long as Medlmmune paid royalties under the license, Medlmmune
had no reasonable apprehension of suit. 41 The Supreme Court reversed. The Court acknowledged that Medlmmune's "own acts ...
eliminate the imminent threat of harm" because "[a]s long as .. . payments are made, there is no risk that [Genentech] will seek to enjoin
[Medlmmune's) sales." 42 But the Court expressly rejected the "reasonable apprehension of suit" test. 43 Instead, the Court reiterated that
"the question in each case is whether the facts alleged, under all the
circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between
parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment."44 Because
Medlmmune sought a declaration of actively contested rights, its own
reluctance to expose itself to liability was no barrier to bringing a declaratory judgment action. As the Court wrote: "The rule that a plaintiff must destroy a large building, bet the farm, or (as here) risk treble
damages and the loss of 80 percent of its business before seeking a
35

Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

See, e.g., BP Chems. Ltd. v. Union Carbide Corp., 4 F.3d 975, 978-80 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
37 Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
38 See id. at 121.
39 Id. at 122.
40 Id.
41 See id.
42 Id. at 128.
43 See id. at 132 n.11.
44 Id. at 127 (internal quotation marks omitted).
36
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declaration of its actively contested legal rights finds no support in
Article III. " 45
In the years since the Med/mmune decision, the Federal Circuit
has not been consistent either in its articulation of the legal standards
for justiciability in patent validity actions or in its application of those
standards across different factual circumstances. But a pattern has
emerged in which, once again, the likelihood of standing depends
upon how close the parties are to engaging in infringement litigation.
One strand of the caselaw has adopted a weaker version of the
pre-Med/mmune two-part test. In SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 46 the first patent standing case the Federal Circuit decided
after Medlmmune , the court acknowledged that "[t]he Supreme
Court's opinion in Medlmmune represents a rejection of [the] reasonable apprehension of suit test." 47 But it nevertheless held that "jurisdiction generally will not arise merely on the basis that a party learns
of the existence of a patent owned by another or even perceives such a
patent to pose a risk of infringement, without some affirmative act by
the patentee. " 48 Subsequent cases have made clear that the patent
holder must take some threatening action directed at the plaintiff
before the plaintiff can file a declaratory judgment action. 49 With respect to the second prong of the pre-Medlmmune standard, which focused on the declaratory judgment plaintiff's conduct, the Federal
Circuit has continued to hold that the plaintiff must demonstrate some
"meaningful preparation to conduct potentially infringing activity. "50
This line reached its apotheosis in Ass'n for Molecular Pathology
v. USPTO ,51 the gene patents case. In that case, the Federal Circuit
held that "to establish an injury in fact traceable to the patentee, a
declaratory judgment plaintiff must allege both (1) an affirmative act
Id. at 134.
SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
47 Id. at 1380.
48 Id. at 1381 (emphasis added).
49 See, e.g., Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 689 F.3d 1303, 1319, 1323 (Fed. Cir.
2012), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics,
Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013); Innovative Therapies, Inc. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 599 F.3d 1377,
1382 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding that "the fact that [the patent holder] had filed infringement suits
against other parties ... does not, in the absence of any act directed toward [the plaintiff], meet
the minimum standard" for jurisdiction).
so Cat Tech LLC v. TubeMaster, Inc., 528 F.3d 871, 880 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also SanDisk,
480 F.3d at 1380 & n.2 (declining to address "the effect of Medimmune , if any, on the second
prong" of the court of appeals's previous test).
51 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012), affdin part,
rev'd in part sub nom. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107
(2013).
45

46
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by the patentee related to the enforcement of his patent rights, and
(2) meaningful preparation to conduct potentially infringing activity."52 This test is quite similar to that which the Supreme Court disapproved in Medlmmune. 53 The analysis is roughly the same, just less
demanding. Indeed, the Federal Circuit has at times described
Medlmmune's impact solely as "lower[ing] the bar" 54 or creating a
"more lenient legal standard"55 for declaratory judgment jurisdiction
rather than fundamentally changing the legal analysis.
The Ass'n for Molecular Pathology plaintiffs were a group of physicians, medical researchers, and professional organizations, all of
whom claimed that they were prevented from carrying out diagnostic
genetic testing by the presence of Myriad's patents on the human
genes associated with an increased risk of breast cancer. 56 The court
first held that only those plaintiffs against whom Myriad had personally directed patent enforcement efforts could bring an action, despite
the widespread knowledge that Myriad vigorously enforced its patent
rights as a general matter. 57 Of the three remaining plaintiffs who had
been the targets of royalty demands, cease-and-desist letters, or the
like, only one alleged that if the patents were declared invalid he
would immediately begin genetic testing. 58 The court held that this
plaintiff alone had standing. 59
Other panels of the Federal Circuit have articulated different
tests for standing in declaratory judgment actions. Some have focused
on a mirror image theory of declaratory judgment jurisdiction, in
which a case is justiciable only if there is "an underlying legal cause of
action that the declaratory defendant could have brought or
threatened to bring." 60 A few have placed the inquiry in the context
52

Id. at 1318 (citations omitted).
Compare id., with Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
("There must be both (1) an explicit threat or other action by the patentee, which creates a
reasonable apprehension on the part of the declaratory judgment plaintiff that it will face an
infringement suit, and (2) present activity which could constitute infringement or concrete steps
taken with the intent to conduct such activity." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
54 Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Acceleron LLC, 587 F.3d 1358, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
55 Micron Tech., Inc. v. Mosaid Techs., Inc., 518 F.3d 897, 902 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
56 See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1313-14.
51 See id. at 1319.
58 See id.
59 Id. In the Supreme Court, Myriad renewed its argument that this remaining plaintiff
lacked standing. The Court dismissed this argument in a footnote, writing simply that the plaintiff had standing under the standard in Medlmmune. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2115 n.3 (2013).
60 Arris Grp., Inc. v. British Telecomms. PLC, 639 F.3d 1368, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (emphasis added); see also Powertech Tech. Inc. v. Tessera, Inc., 660 F.3d 1301, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2011);
53
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of standing or ripeness doctrines more generally. 61 More often the
court has chosen to analyze the justiciability of a particular case directly under the standards announced in Medlmmune. The court will,
for example, simply restate Medlmmune's holding that "the fundamental inquiry [is] 'whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties
having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to
warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment,' " 62 and then proceed
to focus on the aspect of that statement that seems most directly implicated by the facts of the case. 63 These cases appear to tum on ad
hoc determinations whether both the plaintiff and the defendant have
done enough for the court to conclude that they are in an active dispute with each other that looks and feels close to an infringement
action.
II.

A

THEORY OF PATENT INJURY

Although the cases described above take divergent approaches to
the standing question, they appear to be united in an underlying assumption: "[t]he mere existence of a potentially adverse patent does
not cause an injury." 64 That assumption is incorrect. This Part articulates a different concept of the injury arising from potentially adverse
patents.
Intellectual property is an exclusive right. It is a grant that enables its holder to exclude others from taking certain actions that may
fall within the boundaries of the right. A patent is a right to prevent
Creative Compounds, LLC v. Starmark Labs., 651 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Benitec
Aust!., Ltd. v. Nucleonics, Inc., 495 F.3d 1340, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2007). These cases cite Microchip
Technology Inc. v. Chamberlain Group, Inc., 441 F .3d 936 (Fed. Cir. 2006), a pre-Medimmune
case which held that "[t]he concepts of 'adverse legal rights' and 'legal risk' used in [prior] cases
to describe the standard for jurisdiction require that there be an underlying legal cause of action
that the declaratory defendant could have brought or threatened to bring, if not for the fact that
the declaratory plaintiff has preempted it." Id. at 943 (emphasis added).
61 See, e.g., Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Eisai Co., 620 F.3d 1341, 1346-47 (Fed. Cir. 2010),
vacated on other grounds, 131 S. Ct. 2991 (2011) (mem.); Prasco, LLC v. Medicis Pharm. Corp.,
537 F.3d 1329, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Forest Labs., Inc., 527 F.3d
1278, 1291-92 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330,
1337 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
62 Matthews Int'! Corp. v. Biosafe Eng'g, LLC, 695 F.3d 1322, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007)).
63 See id. at 1328-31; see also Danisco U .S. Inc. v. Novozymes A/S, 744 F.3d 1325, 1330-33
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (emphasizing the examination is under the totality of the circumstances); Streck,
Inc. v. Research & Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 665 F.3d 1269, 1282-84 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (focusing on
"reasonable apprehension of suit" arising from unasserted claims).
64 Prasco, 537 F.3d at 1338.
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others from "mak[ing], us[ing], offer[ing] to sell, or sell[ing] any patented invention. "65 Patent rights are negative rights that confer the
ability to exclude others from practicing the invention. 66
But consider what the patent grant means to those others. From
their perspective, a patent is a form of regulation. It is, as Mark Lemley explains, a "regulatory intervention in the marketplace that is designed to restrict what people can do with their own ideas and their
own property." 67 In the absence of a patent, ideas are freely appropriable. As the Supreme Court has explained on numerous occasions,
the public has a "federal right to copy and to use" that which is not or
cannot be the subject of intellectual property protection. 68 "In general, unless an intellectual property right such as a patent or copyright
protects an item, it will be subject to copying." 69 The default rule is
that an inventor or creator has the freedom to invent and create as she
pleases. The presence of intellectual property, on the other hand,
places a restraint on that freedom. A patent sets off-as against the
world-a portion of the public domain that no one can enter without
permission. It is a regulation of inventors' primary behavior. Such
persons cannot use the invention without first securing a license to do
so. Failing that, they are subject to liability.
But intellectual property rights are uncertain, in several respects.
First, intellectual property rights are of uncertain validity. Although
the Patent Act provides that issued patents are presumed valid,70 the
final determination whether a patent is valid remains for the courts. 71
A patent holder is free of course to try to enforce her rights upon
grant. But the validity of her holding is not certain until litigation.
Empirical evidence suggests that this is no minor concern-some stud65

35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012).

See Adam Mossoff, Exclusion and Exclusive Use in Patent Law, 22 HARv. J.L. & TECH.
321, 327-30 (2009).
66

67 Mark A. Lemley, The Regulatory Turn in IP, 36 HARV. J.L. & Pue. PoL'Y 109, 110
(2013); see also Mark A. Lemley, Taking the Regulatory Nature of IP Seriously, 92 TEx. L. REV.
SEE ALSO 107, 107-08 (2014).
68 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 165 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964)
("An unpatentable article, like an article on which the patent has expired, is in the public domain and may be made and sold by whoever chooses to do so.").
69 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33 (2003) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29
(2001)).
70

35 U.S.C. § 282(a) ("A patent shall be presumed valid.").

71

See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242-43 (2011).
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ies find that one-third to nearly one-half of patents litigated to judgment will ultimately be found invalid. 72
Second, patent boundaries are often quite uncertain. This uncertainty hampers potential inventors from determining precisely what
actions or behavior they need to eschew to avoid infringement. In
brief, patent claims define the metes and bounds of the exclusive right,
but those claims are written as broadly as possible and often are vague
or, at the very least, subject to multiple competing interpretations. 73
The process of patent litigation does little to resolve this uncertainty.
Claim constructions are not definitively resolved until appeaF 4 and
even then the judges of the Federal Circuit disagree sharply about
how to interpret patent claims. 75

72 The most recent study of litigation outcomes found that 42% of final decisions on validity result in a judgment of invalidity. See John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & David L.
Schwartz, Understanding the Realities of Modern Patent Litigation , 92 TEX. L. REv. 1769, 1787 &
fig.4 (2014). This is consistent with older studies, despite great changes in patent law. See id. at
1801 & n.110; see also John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of
Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205 (1998) (reporting 46% invalidity rate for patent validity challenges litigated to judgment at trial); Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent
Cases-An Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. R EV. 365, 390 (2000) (reporting
33 % invalidity rate for patent validity challenges litigated to judgment at trial). Of course, these
studies do not tell us much about the validity of the very large number of patents that are never
litigated or that are subject to litigation resolved prior to decisions on the merits. But there is
other evidence suggesting that a large number of invalid patents issue. See JAMES BESSEN &
MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 160-63 (2008) (summarizing evidence).
73 This phenomenon has been well documented. See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note
72, at 54-62; Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent
Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REv. 1743, 1744-46 (2009); Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. R EV. 719, 774-75 (2009).
74 See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831_, 840-42 (2015) (holding that
district court factfinding in claim construction is subject to clear error review but that "ultimate
interpretation [of a patent claim] is a legal conclusion" reviewed de novo); J. Jonas Anderson &
Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: A Historical, Empirical, and Normative Analysis of Patent
Claim Construction , 108 Nw. U . L. REv. 1, 40 & tbl.3 (2013) (detailing high Federal Circuit
reversal rates of district court claim construction rulings).
75 See, e.g. , Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 653 F.3d 1296 (Fed. Cir.
2011). In construing the claim, the majority began by stating, " [i]t is axiomatic that the claim
construction process entails more than viewing the claim language in isolation," id. at 1305, while
the dissent began by noting that it is "a bedrock principle of patent law that the claims themselves ... define the patented invention," id. at 1312 (Rader, C.J., dissenting) (internal quotations omitted); see also Anderson & Menell, supra note 74, at 6 ("The lack of consensus among
judges on the Federal Circuit continues to produce uncertainty and confusion for the patent
system.").
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As Lemley and Shapiro write, patents are "probabilistic. " 76 Because the right is neither certainly valid nor of certain boundaries, it is
not a "right to exclude but rather a right to try to exclude." 77 Now
consider, once again, the alternative perspective. Those working in a
field in which there is an extant patent face a risk of infringement
liability. It is possible that business or investing activity may run afoul
of the intellectual property. But it is often quite difficult to know with
any degree of certainty whether particular behavior will do so. 78
That risk is an injury. Economic actors face a present risk of liability if they wish to engage in activity that might fall within the
boundaries of the purported exclusive right. In determining whether
and how to undertake a particular activity, those actors must account
for that risk and alter their behavior in response. The risk posed by
intellectual property represents, in any given instant, an actual injury.
A person wishing to engage in activity that may be the subject of exclusive rights has several choices available to her: she can take a license, she can ignore the rights and proceed with the activity, she can
attempt to design around the rights to the extent she can meaningfully
assess them, or she can abandon the activity altogether. In all events,
the presence of the intellectual property right in a particular field undoubtedly constrains the behavior of those operating in the field.
This effect is due in no small part to the severity and timing of the
penalties for infringement. As to the former, patents often are enforced through injunctions. 79 Infringers must often give up all or part
of their activity. Substantial damages are also likely. Patent holders
may be entitled to lost profits or a reasonable royalty.80 But in some
cases-especially relevant here, where the infringer is on notice of the
existence of the patent-courts retain the discretion to enhance those
damages up to three times the awarded amount. 81 As to timing,
neither the validity of the intellectual property right nor the likelihood
of infringement of that right can be determined with certainty until
costly litigation is undertaken.82
In a world in which this uncertainty did not exist, potential infringers could reasonably determine (1) whether they are subject to
76 Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, J.
75 (2005).
77 Id. at 75.
78 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
79 See 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2012).
so See id. § 284.
s1 Id.
82 See supra notes 71- 72, 73-75 and accompanying text.
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regulation through an existing intellectual property right and,
(2) whether their planned conduct would violate that regulation. But
because intellectual property is uncertain, potential infringers must
make decisions about their behavior in the shadow of a significant
threat: that, after their decisions have been made, they may be subject
to injunctive relief and treble damages in an infringement suit. 83
The risk posed by potentially adverse "probabilistic" patents can
affect regulated persons' or entities' decisionmaking in several ways.
First, as Christopher Leslie explains in the patent context, the risk of
infringement liability "can ... increase entry costs by compelling rivals
to research the patent's validity, to attempt to design around the patent, or to pay (unnecessary) license fees." 84 Each of these responses
to risk imposes some significant cost. Investigating the validity of intellectual property, for example, usually requires the payment of legal
fees to produce a "freedom to operate" report. 85 Designing around
requires the expenditure of resources that could otherwise be devoted
to innovation in the first instance.86 Innovators operating in a field
occupied by potentially adverse intellectual property may find it difficult to attract capital or may face increased costs of capital. 87
The risk of infringement usually remains even after these costs
are incurred. That makes business planning more difficult. As Leslie
also observed, "it is difficult for the potential entrant to perform a
proper cost-benefit analysis because it is exceedingly difficult to estimate the probability of prevailing on an invalidity defense in a patent
infringement suit." 88 The result is a potentially strong deterrent effect.89 In some cases, a firm will find it not worth the risk to undertake
83 See §§ 283-284.
84 Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects of Unenforced Invalid Patents, 91
MINN. L. REV. 101, 104 (2006).
85 See Mark D. Janis & Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Law's Audience, 97 MINN. L. REV.
72, 116 (2012) (describing "the need for members of the public to consult with counsel to determine whether their activities tread on the property rights of others"); see also BESSEN &
MEURER, supra note 72, at 131-32 (detailing the estimated legal costs of different stages of
patent litigation).
86 See Leslie, supra note 84, at 121.
87 See id. at 119-20.
88 Id. at 117; see also id. at 133-34 (discussing difficulties of prevailing in litigation).
89 Others have observed that patents may deter potentially infringing activity. See, e.g.,
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Dethroning Lear: Licensee Estoppel and the Incentive to Innovate, 72
VA. L. REv. 677, 755 (1986) ("The existence of the patent-and the fear of an infringement
action-may deter some potential rivals from competing with the patentee and his licensees.");
David Fagundes & Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Intellectual Property, 65 VAND. L. REv. 677, 698
(2012) ("Firms that face the prospect of being nickel-and-dimed by owners of dubious patents
may well choose to refrain from investing in new technologies or entering new markets in the
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activity that requires investment that can then be held up in the face
of adverse intellectual property. This is especially so because many
startups and technology entrepreneurs are rationally risk averse. 90
This effect is especially significant when investments must be
made over time. Pharmaceutical research and development provides
an important example of the problem. The process of discovering, developing, and then securing FDA approval to market a new drug is
very time consuming and expensive. 91 If a drug cannot, for any reason, be marketed, the costs of its development generally are sunk. 92
They cannot meaningfully be reallocated to other projects. 93 Pharmaceutical firms therefore must make significant asset-specific investments many years prior to marketing.
Now consider what happens when there is a potentially adverse
patent in the field. 94 At the time the firm begins making investments
in research and development, it is uncertain whether the patent is
valid or whether the firm's ultimate product may infringe. 95 The firm
faces a choice. If it goes ahead, it will make sunk investments of many
years and many millions of dollars only to face the possibility that
those investments will be held up by the patent owner, who can
threaten an injunction or treble damages. Or the firm can abandon
the project in the face of that risk. Many, perhaps most, rational firms
will choose the latter. Indeed, the Federal Trade Commission found
in this context that "firms in the biotech industry ... avoid infringing
questionable patents and therefore will refrain from entering or continuing with a particular field of research that such patents appear to
cover. " 96 This dynamic is not limited to the pharmaceutical or biofirst place."); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation ? Th e
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 699 (1998); Leslie, supra note 84, at 119;
Gideon Parchomovsky & Michael Mattioli, Partial Patents, 111 CoLUM. L. REv. 207, 218 (2011)
("Surveys and practitioner accounts show that the risks of litigation and the potentially high
costs of investigating existing patents deter many firms from pursuing certain lines of research
and development in the first place.").
90 See Leslie, supra note 84, at 116-17.
91 See Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87 TEx.
L. REv. 503, 510-11 & nn.21-22 (2009).
92 See Nancy T. Gallini, The Economics of Patents: Lessons from Recent U.S. Patent Reform,]. Ec oN. PERSP., Spring 2002, at 131, 136-37.
93 See id.
94 The facts of this discussion roughly mirror those in Benitec Australia, Ltd. v. Nucleonics,
Inc., 495 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2007), in which the Federal Circuit found that a pharmaceutical
firm lacked standing to seek a declaration that a patent was invalid. Id. at 1349.
95 This uncertainty is a function both of the potentially fuzzy boundaries of the patent and
of the unclear characteristics of the final product.
96 FED. TRADE CoMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF Co MPETI-
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technology industries. It occurs whenever product development cycles require investment prior to potentially infringing activity. There
exists some empirical evidence that suggests that such a deterrent effect is a real and significant obstacle to innovation. 97
So long as intellectual property remains valid, the risk of infringement liability persists regardless of whether or not the owner takes
enforcement actions. Judge Learned Hand recognized this dynamic
when he referred to unenforced but invalid patents as "scarecrow[ s]. "98 More colorfully, Leslie refers to such a patent as "a head
on a pike." 99 "Until a court invalidates it, or until the owner explicitly
disavows it and dedicates it to the public domain," he writes, "every
patent can give pause to potential competitors who know about it." 100
Ill.

STANDING TO REMEDY PATENT INJURY

Because the Federal Circuit has misconceived the injury in patent
challenges, it has developed an inappropriate set of standing rules.
The Federal Circuit's "proximity" approach to standing makes sense
only if the relevant injury is the infringement action itself. In this Part,
I argue that standing to resolve the uncertainty posed by issued patTION AND PATENT LAw AND PoucY, Exec. Summary at 5 (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf.
97 See FED. TRADE CoMM'N, supra note 96, Exec. Summary at 5; Jean 0. Lanjouw & Mark
Schankerman, Enforcement of Patent Rights in the United States, in PATENTS IN THE KNowLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 145, 146 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003). Mark
Lemley is skeptical that deterrence is a significant problem. See Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 M1cH. ST. L. REv. 19, 20 [hereinafter Lemley, Ignoring Patents] ("Both my own experience and what limited empirical evidence there is suggest that companies do not seem much
deterred from making products by the threat of all this patent litigation."); Mark A. Lerriley,
Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1495, 1516 (2001) [hereinafter Lemley, Rational Ignorance] ("Certainly the issuance of bad patents has the potential to deter competition that should be lawful in some marginal cases. But this concern can be overstated.").
Whether or not deterrence occurs as an empirical matter, however, is irrelevant to the standing
analysis. Actual deterrence is evidence that the risk of IP litigation is concrete and particularized to a particular plaintiff. See infra notes 140-42 and accompanying text. But ignoring the
risk and pressing forward is a response to the risk, not evidence that the risk does not exist.
98 Bresnick v. U.S. Vitamin Corp., 139 F.2d 239, 242 (2d Cir. 1943) (Hand, J.); see also
Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'!, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 96 (1993) (quoting Bresnick, 139 F.2d at
242).
99 Leslie, supra note 84, at 115.
100 Id. at 115-16. In related work, Leslie describes a range of threatening actions short of
filing infringement suit that can deter competitive behavior. These actions include: "publicly
flaunting one's patent; stating a general intent to sue infringers; accusing competitors of infringement; threatening competitors' business partners; and licensing activities." Christopher R. Leslie, Patents of Damocles, 83 IND. L.J. 133, 142-43 (2008).
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ents is supported by well-established constitutional and prudential
standing principles. 101
A.

Article III Standing

The Federal Circuit's scheme for determining when a case is justiciable would appear odd to a federal jurisdiction expert. In every
other area of the law, federal courts apply a familiar framework to
determine whether there is standing to sue. A plaintiff must demonstrate that she (1) has suffered or is "under threat of suffering 'injury
in fact' that is concrete and particularized; the threat must be actual
and imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical;" (2) that injury "must
be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant;" and
(3) "it must be likely that a favorable judicial decision will prevent or
redress the injury." 102 Although the Federal Circuit sometimes references these factors, 103 it does not really grapple with them. Yet, as the
Supreme Court has reminded the Federal Circuit on several occasions,
"familiar principles" of law "apply with equal force to disputes arising
under" the intellectual property statutes.104
Start with injury in fact. The injury described in Part II constitutes an injury in fact for standing purposes under several lines of Supreme Court precedent. 105 In Cardinal Chemical Co. v. Morton
101 I focus here on standing to the exclusion of ripeness. As the Supreme Court noted in
Medlmmune, often "standing and ripeness boil down to the same question" in scenarios where
threatened enforcement is at issue. See Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 128
n.8 (2007); see also 13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3532.5, at 588 n.32 (3d ed. 2008) (noting closeness of
standing and ripeness requirements in threat-of-prosecution in criminal law). In most prospective challenges to the scope or validity of patents, the standing and ripeness issues will merge.
That said, I acknowledge that some actions seeking a declaration of noninfringement will be factspecific enough that ripeness is separately at issue. I put those actions aside in this paper.
102 Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009) (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc.
v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000)).
103 See, e.g., Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 689 F.3d 1303, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2012),
affdin part, rev'd in part sub nom. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133
S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
104 eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (holding that general standard for injunctive relief applied in patent cases); see also Medlmmune, 549 U.S. at 132 n.11
(holding that the "reasonable apprehension of suit" test was inconsistent with more general interpretations of the Declaratory Judgment Act); Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 165 (1999)
(holding that ordinary standards of judicial review of administrative actions applied to Federal
Circuit review of PTO factfinding) .
10s The Court's decision in Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721 (2013), is not to the
contrary. In that case, the Court interpreted a covenant not to sue to include all future products.
Id. at 727-29. In that circumstance, the risk of liability is eliminated. See id.
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International, Inc., 106 for example, the Court held that a judgment of
noninfringement does not moot a counterclaim for a declaration that
a patent is invalid. 107 In that case, Morton sued Cardinal Chemical for
patent infringement. 108 Cardinal Chemical counterclaimed for a declaration that the patents in suit were invalid. 109 The district court
found Morton's patents to be invalid and not infringed. 110 On appeal,
the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment of noninfringement but vacated and dismissed the judgment of invalidity, reasoning that because the patent was not infringed, no case or
controversy remained with respect to validity .111 The Supreme Court
reversed. As described above, the Court first drew a distinction between claims of infringement and validity. 112 The Court then described the injury that would give rise to independent jurisdiction over
the validity claim in terms very similar to those used above. The
Court explained that the Declaratory Judgment Act was designed to
relieve actors of "an in terrorem choice between the incurrence of a
growing potential liability for patent infringement and abandonment
of their enterprises" by allowing suit to "clear the air." 113 The Court
concluded that "[m]erely the desire to avoid the threat of a 'scarecrow' patent, in Learned Hand's phrase, may therefore be sufficient to
establish jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act." 114 A
judgment of noninfringement in a suit brought by a right holder, in the
Court's view, did nothing to address the ongoing risk arising from the
exclusive right: "A company once charged with infringement must remain concerned about the risk of similar charges if it develops and
markets similar products in the future." 115 Medlmmune follows a similar logic. In rejecting the requirement that a licensee breach its contract before challenging the validity of the underlying patent, the
106

Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'!, Inc., 508 U.S. 83 (1993).

101

See id. at 96.

108 Id. at 85-86.
109

Id. at 86.

110

Id.

111

See id. at 87.

112

See id. at 96.

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v.
Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731 , 734-35 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
114 Id. (footnote omitted) (citing Bresnick v. U.S. Vitamin Corp., 139 F.2d 239,242 (2d Cir.
1943)).
115 Id. at 99-100. The Court's holding in Cardinal Chemical was limited to the jurisdiction
of the appellate court. Id. at 95. Nevertheless, because it was discussing the constitutional case
or controversy requirement, its dicta concerning the scope of the injury remains persuasive.
113
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Court necessarily acknowledged that the plaintiff was injured even
though it was not presently subject to an enforcement action. 116
More broadly, recognizing that the risk or uncertainty posed by
extant intellectual property is an injury in fact is consistent with several familiar standing principles. The first is that probabilistic harms
can constitute injury in fact. This notion received its most prominent
expression in Massachusetts v. EPA, 117 in which the Supreme Court
held that the state of Massachusetts had standing to challenge the
EPA's failure to take action to regulate greenhouse gas emissions
under the Clean Air Act. 118 The injury in that case was probabilistic;
it was a risk of harm from global warming. Nevertheless, the Court
held that EPA's "refusal to regulate greenhouse gas emissions
presents a risk of harm to Massachusetts that is both 'actual' and 'imminent.' " 119 A decision in Massachusetts' favor-compelling the EPA
to regulate greenhouse gas emissions-would reduce the risk of harm
that Massachusetts faced. 120 Similarly, in Monsanto Co. v. Geertson
Seed Farms ,121 the Court held that conventional alfalfa farmers had
standing to challenge the Department of Agriculture's decision to deregulate genetically modified alfalfa because that decision created "a
significant risk of gene flow to non-genetically-engineered varieties of
alfalfa," and because that risk harmed the farmers in a variety of ways
"even if their crops are not actually infected with" the genetically
modified seed. 122
A series of lower court decisions have staked out similar positions. The D.C. Circuit, for example, has held that "increases in risk
can at times be 'injuries in fact' sufficient to confer standing" 123 and
has applied that holding to find that an environmental group had
standing to challenge EPA regulations that it alleged created an increased risk of cancer for its members. 124 So too, the Second Circuit
See Medimmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 132-33 & n.11 (2007).
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
us See id. at 526.
119 Id. at 521 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)); see id. at
521-23 (describing risks associated with increased greenhouse gas emissions).
120 Id. at 525-26.
121 Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U .S. 139 (2010).
122 Id. at 155.
123 Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 464 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
124 Id. at 6-7 (holding that a "lifetime risk that an individual will develop nonfatal skin
cancer" of "about 1 in 200,000" is "sufficient to support standing"); see also Mountain States
Legal Found. v. Glickman, 92 F.3d 1228, 1234-35 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that increased risk of
forest fire created by a Forest Service logging rule was sufficient to support group's standing to
challenge rule).
116

117
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held in a case challenging the FDA's decision to permit the use of
downed livestock as food for human consumption that "enhanced
risk" was "cognizable for standing purposes, where the plaintiff alleges exposure to potentially harmful products." 125 And the Seventh
Circuit has held that "even a small probability of injury is sufficient to
create a case or controversy-to take a suit out of the category of the
hypothetical-provided of course that the relief sought would, if
granted, reduce the probability." 126
To be sure, these cases are in tension with the Court's cases holding that speculative future injuries do not give rise to standing. 127 In
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,128 for example, the Court held that a
plaintiff who had previously been subject to a police "chokehold" did
not have standing to seek an injunction against future police use of the
maneuver because he could only state a "subjective apprehension[ ]"
that the event might occur again in the future. 129 In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife ,130 the Court famously denied standing to plaintiffs to
challenge an Interior Department determination that the Endangered
Species Act applied only to domestic activities when they could only
assert that they might one day travel to foreign countries, where the
Department's rule made it less likely they would be able to see endangered species. 131 Most recently, in Clapper v. Amnesty International
USA, 132 the Court held that plaintiffs challenging the government's
warrantless wiretapping authority under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act lacked standing because the risk that they might be sub12s

Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 634 (2d Cir. 2003).

126

Vill. of Elk Grove Vill. v. Evans, 997 F.2d 328, 329 (7th Cir. 1993) (Posner, J.).

127 The courts of appeals are split on the issue as well. See, e.g. , Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Nat'I
Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 489 F.3d 1279, 1298-99 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (Sentelle, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); Shain v. Veneman, 376 F.3d 815, 818 (8th Cir. 2004); Baur, 352
F.3d at 651 & n.3 (Pooler, J., dissenting). There is also debate among the courts of appeals and
in the academic literature over whether all increases in risk constitute injury in fact or whether
only a subset of risks that are judged sufficiently substantial should qualify. See, e.g., F. Andrew
Hessick, Probabilistic Standing, 106 Nw. U. L. REv. 55, 61-65 (2012) (describing caselaw that
finds injury in fact only when risk is sufficiently high); Amanda Leiter, Substance or Illusion ?
The Dangers of Imposing a Standing Threshold, 91 GEO. L.J. 391 , 403-04 (2009) (arguing that
risk thresholds are unique to the D.C. Circuit).
128

City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983).

129

Id. at 105--07 & n.8.

130

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).

Id. at 558-64 ("Such 'some day' intentions-without any description of concrete plans,
or indeed even any specification of when the some day will be-do not support a finding of the
'actual or imminent' injury that our cases require.").
131

132

Clapper v. Amnesty Int'I USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
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ject to government monitoring was too speculative and actions taken
to mitigate therefore were unreasonable. 133
The Court's cases in this area are notoriously difficult to harmonize. But there are reasons to believe, at the very least, that they do
not preclude standing for plaintiffs who assert the injury in fact arising
from IP described above. 134 As several scholars have recently argued,
there is a conceptual distinction between actual, that is, present, injuries based on uncertain facts and threatened future injuries. 135 Andrew Hessick argues that "[a] plaintiff facing a threat of injury from a
defendant's illegal conduct . .. has an interest in preventing that injury
from occurring, or at least an interest in reducing the risk of its occurrence. "136 This interest is a case or controversy under Article III "[s]o
long as (1) the challenged activity increases the plaintiff's risk of suffering harm and (2) a judicial order could stop the challenged activity,
thereby removing the increased risk of harm." 137 Taking a slightly different approach, Jonathan Remy Nash argues that the risk of injury
can be characterized in terms of expected value, proceeding from the
common sense premise that one can assign a dollar value to various
risks. 138 In his view, "[i]f a positive expected value would be sufficient
to support standing were it to arise as a typical 'actual harm,' then the
expected value should be deemed sufficient to support standing. "139
In other words, when a risk has present effect, the risk itself is the
actual injury and a person who experiences that risk in a concrete and
particularized manner has standing to sue to bring about action that
may reduce or eliminate the risk.
The difficult question then is how to sort such presently existing
injuries from speculative future harms. Of particular relevance here,
Id. at 1142-43.
The Court appeared to be skeptical of this theory of IP standing in Already, LLC v.
Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721, 730-31 (2013). But the Court in that case construed the relevant
covenant to completely eliminate any risk of infringement liability for past, present, or future
activities. See id. at 727-29. Its statements regarding risk-based theories of standing are therefore dicta.
135 See Hessick, supra note 127, at 65; Jonathan Remy Nash, Standing's Expected Value, 111
M1cH. L. REv. 1283, 1307 (2013); Cass R. Sunstein, Standing Injuries, 1993 Su P. CT. REv. 37,
47-51; cf Felix T. Wu, Defining Privacy and Utility in Data Sets, 84 U. Cow. L. REv. 1117,
1161-65 (2013) (drawing similar distinction with respect to harms occurring in potential privacy
breaches).
136 Hessick, supra note 127, at 66.
137 Id. at 67; see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies-And Their Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REv. 633, 698-99 (2006) (arguing
for low bar to standing for threatened injuries).
138 See Nash, supra note 135, at 1284.
139 Nash, supra note 135, at 1306.
133

134
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the Court appears more likely to find standing on the basis of present
risk when the plaintiff is within or very close to the zone of primary
conduct regulation and the costs of uncertainty are high. Consider
two lines of decisions. The first are cases that confer standing on
plaintiffs seeking to challenge the validity of statutes or regulations
before they are enforced. As the Supreme Court noted in Medlmmune, "where threatened action by government is concerned, we do
not require a plaintiff to expose himself to liability before bringing suit
to challenge the basis for the threat-for example, the constitutionality of a law threatened to be enforced." 140 In the First Amendment
context, for example, the Court has emphasized that standing is appropriate where the "alleged danger ... is ... one of self-censorship; a
harm that can be realized even without" enforcement. 141 The Court
has similarly held with respect to criminal prohibitions that "it is not
necessary that [a litigant] first expose himself to actual arrest or prosecution to be entitled to challenge a statute that he claims deters the
exercise of his constitutional rights." 142
In these cases, the plaintiff is subject to regulation by the government. There is a statute telling him what he can or cannot do. And
the penalties for noncompliance are high-the plaintiff either ceases
otherwise constitutionally protected activity or risks criminal sanctions. IP validity litigation follows this structure. There is an exclusive
right in place that purports to regulate others in the field; they must
avoid the subject matter of the right or take a license. 143 The penalties
for not doing so are high-injunctive relief and significant damages
awards. 144 But the lawfulness of the regulation is uncertain. 145 In
those circumstances, the plaintiff need not risk liability before bringing suit.

140

Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U .S. 118, 128-29 (2007) (emphasis omitted).

141

Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 393 (1988).

Steffel v. Thompson, 415,U.S. 452, 459 (1974); see Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,
561 U.S. 1, 15 (2010) (allowing pre-enforcement review of statute where credible threat of prosecution existed); Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'! Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979) (same);
13B WruoHT, MILLER & CooPER, supra note 101, § 3532.5, at 585-86 (" If there is a present
desire to engage in apparently crinlinal activity . . . existence of a crinlinal prohibition should
alone be sufficient basis for adjudication. Fear that courts may find the statute valid will deter
many from risking violation; defense of criminal proceedings on constitutional grounds simply is
not an adequate remedy.").
142

143

See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.

144

See 35 U.S.C. §§ 283-284 (2012).

145

See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
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Consider too another source of analogy: real property. 146 We ordinarily presume, as the Medlmmune court noted, that a developer of
real property need not build on that property before going to court to
clear title to the property. 147 Indeed, it has long been recognized that
resolving disputes over property prior to fixed costs being incurred is a
legitimate use of the courts. 148 Federal courts appear to follow this
presumption. 149 There is little difference for standing purposes between a real estate developer confronting uncertain land title and an
innovator confronting uncertain intellectual property in her field.
Each experiences a present injury from the uncertainty in the underlying property rights, and each ought to be able to sue to clear the field
prior to making costly investments.
These kinds of injuries are distinguishable from those found insufficient for standing in Defenders of Wildlife, Lyons, and Clapper.
Take Defenders of Wildlife, to start. In that case, there was no question that the "plaintiff's asserted injury ar[ose] from the government's
allegedly unlawful regulation . . . of someone else. " 150 The Court
therefore characterized the plaintiffs' injuries not as a present risk of
harm, but as threatened harm that would arise upon the unfolding of a
long chain of events, none of which were particularly imminent. 151
146 My argument from real property is limited. I do not make any claim that intellectual
and real property are broadly similar. Cf Mark A . Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and
Free Riding, 83 TEx. L. REv. 1031, 1031-32 (2005) (arguing that real property's "free riding"
rhetoric is misguided as applied to intellectual property). I note only the parallel structure of the
justiciability problem: in both cases, one litigant must make decisions under a cloud of uncertainty with potentially far-reaching consequences.
147 See Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 133-34 (2007); Lemley, Ignoring
Patents, supra note 97, at 23 ("If I want to build a house, I'd better be darn sure that I own the
land on which the house is built.").
148 See BoRCHARD, supra note 26, at 741.
149 Because most property litigation takes place in state courts, the question who has standing under Article III to clear title to real property arises only rarely. In Medlmmune, the Court
described the facts of a prior case, Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n., 277 U.S. 274 (1928), in
which a lessee brought suit to remove a "cloud" on its lease, and observed that there would
likely have been standing under the (subsequently enacted) Declaratory Judgment Act. See 549
U.S. at 133-34. The Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2409a (2012), authorizes suit against the United
States "to adjudicate a disputed title to real property in which the United States claims an interest." Id. § 2409a(a). Courts have held that there is broad standing under the Act to remedy the
effects of uncertainty as to land titles. See, e.g., Avista Corp. v. Sanders Cnty., 405 F. App'x 225,
226 (9th Cir. 2010) ("The injury to Avista is caused by the Jack of resolution of the question of
land ownership. The requested relief of resolution of the title dispute and a determination of the
owner of the right of way would redress that injury."); United States v. Carpenter, 526 F.3d 1237,
1240 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding Article III standing to intervene in action to settle land title
dispute).
150 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992).
151 See id. at 564---65.
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The plaintiff's "apprehension" about the chokehold procedure in Lyons was "subjective" because the authorization for such a move, if
any, did not directly impact the plaintiff's current behavior. 152 So too
in Clapper, the risk that one of the plaintiffs might have her communications intercepted was speculative because the wiretapping was directed at someone else and it would only be through a long chain of
happenstance that the plaintiffs found themselves caught up in the interceptions.153 The Clapper court went further, and held that steps the
plaintiffs undertook to minimize their risk did not themselves establish standing, but that holding only follows logically from the first. 154
The risk of harm arising from invalid IP is, if nothing else, significantly more direct than in the cases above. In an IP validity case, the
plaintiff is the object of the regulation. The only barriers to liability
are the plaintiff's choice to engage in activity that may fall within the
IP holder's exclusive right and the IP holder's choice to enforce those
rights. That is precisely the same structure described in the cases allowing pre-enforcement challenges to government statutes or rules. 155
As the Court held in Medlmmune, it makes no difference whether the
enforcement of proscriptions on primary conduct is in the hands of the
government or private individuals. 156 In either circumstance, the
plaintiff faces a risk of enforcement that forces changes to its present
behavior.
With a proper understanding of the nature of the injury in claims
alleging that intellectual property is invalid, causation and redressability follow with considerably greater ease. 157 For an injury to be
the subject of judicial relief, it must be "fairly traceable" to the defendant. 158 There must be "a causal connection between the injury and
the conduct complained of." 159 The defendant's conduct must be a
"but for" cause of the injury, 160 and the causal chain between the injury and the defendant cannot be so attenuated that there is no "substantial likelihood" that the relief sought will redress the injury. 161
152
153

City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105-107 & nn.7-8 (1983).
Clapper v. Amnesty Int') USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1148-50 (2013).
154
id. at 1150-51.
155
supra note 142 and accompanying text.
156
Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. 549 U.S. 118, 128-33 (2007).
157
13A WRIGHT, MILLER & CooPER, supra note 101, § 3531.5, at 305 ("The choice
among alternative definitions of the injury may control the determination of causation.").
158 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (internal quotation marks and
alteration omitted).
159 Id.
160 See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 75 (1978).
161 Vt. Agency of Nat') Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 771 (2000).
See
See
See
See
See
See
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The injury described above-increased risk and uncertainty-is
caused by the existence vel non of intellectual prope1ty in a given
field. So long as the intellectual property remains, it can serve as a
scarecrow and create a meaningful risk of liability for others working
in the field. 162 The existence of the intellectual property, in tum, is
caused both by the right holder and the PTO, the government agency
responsible for issuing the patent. Under traditional standing principles, either is an acceptable defendant in an action challenging the
validity of intellectual property .163
In an action against a private party seeking to invalidate that
party's intellectual property, the injury described above arises from
the defendant's having acquired and then subsequently holding or
maintaining the intellectual property. A patent only comes into being
through actions of the inventor. An inventor must apply to the PTO
for a patent. 164 In so doing, the inventor defines the patent's scope
and bound~ries. 165 She does more than merely conjure up the patent;
she affirmatively shapes the risks to which she exposes others. A patent applicant must disclose her new, useful, and nonobvious invention
and must conclude her application with "one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the
inventor ... regards as the invention. " 166 The patent applicant drafts
the claims, which define the scope of the invention, its metes and
bounds. 167 Patentees usually try to draft their claims as broadly as
possible. 168 And as a practical matter, patentees then engage in a negotiation with the patent examiner with the goal of having as broad a
claim as possible issue. 169 The patent holder then holds her intellectual property and often must take affirmative steps to maintain it,
such as by paying periodic maintenance fees to the PTO. 170
See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
For the purpose of this argument, I am agnostic about which is the proper defendant as
a matter of policy. I address that question infra Part IV.C.
164 See 35 U .S.C. § 111 (2012).
165 See id.
166 Id. § 112{b).
167 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996) (describing the
claim as "the portion of the patent document that defines the scope of the patentee's rights");
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en bane) {"It is a bedrock principle
of patent law that the claims of a patent define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the
right to exclude." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
168 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 73, at 1762-63.
169 See Michael J. Burstein, Rules for Patents, 52 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1747, 1756 &
nn.42-43 (2011).
110 See, e.g., 35 U .S.C. § 4l{b)(l).
162
163
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Of course, the PTO also directly causes the injury when it issues a
patent. Because patents do not exist absent government action, the
agency that takes such action is a but-for cause of the risk that arises
upon .their issuance. It is true in a sense that causation is shared between the applicant and the government. In order for a patent to
come into existence, an applicant needs to file an application and then
the government needs to approve the application and issue the patent.171 Both are necessary causes of the injury and neither is a sufficient cause alone. But such shared causation does not ordinarily
defeat standing. 172
Redressability, finally, is straightforward. The risk caused by uncertain patents is removed when the patent's validity or boundaries
are adjudicated. A judicial finding that a patent is invalid has preclusive effect against the owner. 173 It is a finding that is good in any subsequent litigation. In appeals of administrative actions, the result of a
judicial finding of invalidity would be to order the agency to cancel the
patent. 174
B.

Prudential Standing

Quite apart from Article III standing, the courts have developed
various theories of "prudential" standil)g: "flexible rules of federal appellate practice designed to protect the courts from deciding abstract
questions of wide public significance . . . when other governmental
institutions may be more competent to address the questions." 175
They are "judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction"176 that are "designed to deny standing as a matter of judicial prudence rather than constitutional command." 177 The question
whether a patent challenger has standing under Article III is in some
ways distinct from the question whether any particular challenger is
171
172

See id. §§ 111, 151.
See 13A WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 101, § 3531.5, at 311-15 & n.30 ("It
may be enough that the defendant's conduct is one among multiple causes." (citing cases)).
173 See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 334, 350 (1971).
174 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 311(b), 32l(b).
175 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2686 (2013) (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citation omitted).
176 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
177 13A WRIGHT, MILLER & CooPER, supra note 101, § 3531.7, at 513. There is some debate over whether prudential standing requirements, like constitutional standing requirements,
are "jurisdictional" in the sense that parties cannot waive or forfeit them. See, e.g. , Grocery
Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 693 F.3d 169, 184-85 & n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting)
(identifying circuit split and arguing that prudential standing is not jurisdictional). I s~t this
debate aside for the purpose of the analysis that follows.

526

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:498

an appropriate plaintiff. Indeed, the latter question more than the
former seems to drive much of the Federal Circuit's jurisprudence in
this area.
Neither the Federal Circuit nor any other court has developed a
consistent theory of prudential standing to challenge the validity of a
patent. In other areas of the law, however, prudential standing principles operate primarily to limit standing to instances where statutory
objectives are achieved rather than undermined.178 Most broadly, for
example, in the context of challenges to administrative action under
the Administrative Procedure Act, the court has required plaintiffs to
show that the interests they assert are "arguably within the zone of
interests to be protected or regulated by the statute" that provides the
relevant decisional law. 179 This test asks whether the plaintiff is
among the class of persons protected by the statute, and whether her
alleged injury is among the sorts of interests that the statute was designed to protect. 180
In a similar vein are well-developed principles of prudential
standing in particular fields. Take antitrust, for example. 181 Section 4
of the Clayton Act provides broadly that "any person who shall be
injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in
the antitrust laws ... shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained. "182 But the Supreme Court has long held that this general Ian178 See, e.g., Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 397 n.12 (1987) (stating that the
"zone of interest" inquiry "seeks to exclude those plaintiffs whose suits are more likely to frustrate than to further statutory objectives").
179 Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970); see Match-EBe-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 2199, 2210 (2012). This
test has its origin in an interpretation of section 702 of the APA, which provides that "[a] person
suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency
action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." 5 U.S.C.
§ 702 (2012). Although some cases have suggested that the zone of interests formulation is
"most usefully understood as a gloss on the meaning of§ 702," Clarke, 479 U.S. at 400 n.16, and
therefore limited to suits brought under the APA, other cases suggest that the formulation is
applicable more broadly. See, e.g. , Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863, 870 (2011)
(interpreting parallel language in Title VII).
180 See Lujan v. Nat'! Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 882-83 (1990).
181 See, e.g. , Sunbeam Television Corp. v. Nielsen Media Research, Inc., 711 F.3d 1264, 1270
(11th Cir. 2013) ("The doctrine of antitrust standing reflects prudential concerns and is designed
to avoid burdening the courts with speculative or remote claims. Antitrust standing is a conscientious method to find the proper private plaintiff to enforce the antitrust laws." (citation omitted)); Gatt Commc'ns, Inc. v. PMC Assocs., 711 F.3d 68, 82 n.1 (2d Cir. 2013) (Wesley, J.,
concurring) ("Antitrust standing involves an analysis of prudential considerations aimed at
avoiding counter-productive use of antitrust laws in ways that could harm competition rather
than protecting it." (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted)).
182 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012). The Clayton Act also provides that "[a]ny person .. . shall be
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guage is "implicitly qualified." 183 These qualifications are primarily
twofold. The first is that the plaintiff must successfully allege "antitrust injury." That is, the plaintiff's alleged injury must not only constitute an injury in fact sufficient to invoke the court's Article III
jurisdiction, but it must also be an "injury of the type the antitrust
laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which mRkes
defendants' acts unlawful." 184 The facts of the germinal case offer a
good example of the concept. In Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-OMat, lnc. ,185 the plaintiffs were bowling alleys that challenged on antitrust grounds the merger of their struggling competitor with a wellfinanced supplier that would enable the competitor to remain viable.186 Even assuming that the merger was a violation of the antitrust
laws, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs did not have standing
to bring their claim because their theory of injury-that they would be
injured because they would face competition from the newly rejuvenated bowling alley-was exactly the opposite of the injury that the
antitrust laws were meant to remedy. 187 The plaintiffs were complaining of more competition, while the antitrust laws were intended
to provide remedies for injuries arising from less competition. The
modem "antitrust injury" rule operates to limit antitrust actions to
those in which the plaintiff's action supports the statutory goal of antitrust enforcement. 188
The second major limitation of antitrust standing is to plaintiffs
whose injuries are not too remote, derivative, or duplicative of
others. 189 Because antitrust violations ripple through the economy, a
potentially very large number of plaintiffs can plausibly claim Article
III injury. Antitrust law therefore favors direct rather than derivative
plaintiffs. If, for example, a supplier is overcharged as a result of illegal price fixing, the supplier's customers-the "indirect purchasers" in
antitrust parlance-generally do not have antitrust standing, at least in
entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief ... against threatened loss or damage by a violation
of the antitrust laws." Id. § 26.

183 UA PHILLIP E. AREEDA, HERBERT HoVENKAMP, RoaER D . BLAIR & CHRISTINE PIETTE DURRANCE, ANTITRUST LAw 'I 335, at 67 (3d ed. 2007) [hereinafter AREEDA &
HoVENKAMP]; see Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters,
459 U .S. 519, 534-35 (1983).
184
185
186
187

Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
See id. at 479-81.

188

See IIA AREEDA & H oVENKAMP, supra note 183, 'I 337, at 88.

189

See id. 'I 339, at 108.

Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).

See id. at 487-89.
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actions seeking damages. 190 That is because such damages actions are
duplicative of actions that can be brought by more direct purchasers.
Efficient litigation therefore favors the direct purchasers.
Together, these doctrines add up to a rough preference for certain
plaintiffs over others in antitrust cases. Consumers, for example, are
usually the preferred plaintiffs. This is consistent with each of the limitations described above. Consumers are the most likely to be injured
in a way that the antitrust laws are meant to prevent-by having to
pay unlawfully higher prices for goods and services. And consumers
are the most direct plaintiffs, thereby making for efficient litigation
(particularly when suit is brought on behalf of a class of consumers).
This is not to say that other plaintiffs are excluded. But they do have
to demonstrate their suitability. As the leading antitrust treatise
notes, "consumers almost always have the correct incentives for suit[;]
rivals do not." 191 That is because "a competitor opposes efficient, aggressive, and legitimate competition by its rivals," and therefore "it
has an incentive to use an antitrust suit to delay their operations or to
induce them to moderate their competition. " 192 But in cases where
the wrongful conduct is exclusionary, such as predatory pricing, then a
competitor's incentives are aligned with the ultimate consumer beneficiaries of the law.193 Similarly, where a competitor is in a better position to detect antitrust violations than a consumer, or where collective
action problems may plague consumer suits, a competitor may be an
appropriate plaintiff. 194
For a contrasting example, consider false advertising cases
brought under section 43 of the Lanham Act. 195 That statute provides
that "any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by" false advertising may sue. 196 In those cases, however, and
unlike in antitrust cases, competitors are the preferred plaintiffs rather
than consumers. 197 That is because the purpose of the Lanham Act is
190 See Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 730-35 (1977). By contrast, the concerns with
duplicative recovery raised in damages actionJ are not present in actions seeking only injunctive
relief. Those actions may therefore usually be brought even by indirect purchasers. See
AREEDA & HoVENKAMP, supra note 183, 'I 346d & n.23, at 166 (citing In re Warfarin Sodium
Antitrust Litig., 214 F.3d 395 (3d Cir. 2000)). .
191 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 183, 'I 348a, at 202.
192 Id.
193 See id. ; see also, e.g. , Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S.
209, 223 (1993).
194 See AREEDA & HovENKAMP, supra note 183, 'I 348a, at 202.
195 15 u.s.c. § 1125 (2012).
196 Id. § 1125(a)(l).
197 Indeed, courts have uniformly held that consumers do not have prudential standing to
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different from the purpose of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Unlike
the antitrust laws, which ultimately are about consumer welfare, 198 the
Lanham Act aims to curb unfair competition. 199 The different statutory purpose yields a different set of potential plaintiffs who may fall
within the zone of interests that the statute protects. As the Supreme
Court has recently held, a Lanham Act false advertising plaintiff "ordinarily must show economic or reputational injury flowing directly
from the deception wrought by the defendant's advertising." 200 Direct
competitors whose economic interests are injured by false advertising
are the most straightforward plaintiffs. 201 But noncompetitors can sue
when their alleged injuries are still within the scope of interests protected by the statute. 202 The reasons are two-fold. First, the modern
economy includes a range of market structures such that indirect competitors may nevertheless be subject to injury from unfair competition
in the commercial marketplace. Entities may have conflicting interests even if they are located at different levels of a supply chain,203 or
compete in adjacent but not identical product markets. 204 Second,
there may be cases in which more appropriate plaintiffs have little
incentive to sue.205 In those cases, more remote plaintiffs can still vindicate the interests protected by the statute. But those plaintiffs need
to demonstrate more convincingly that standing is appropriate. 206
sue under section 43(a)(l}. See, e.g., Made in the USA Found. v. Phillips Foods, Inc., 365 F.3d
278, 280 (4th Cir. 2008); Colligan v. Activities Club of N.Y., Ltd., 442 F.2d 686, 692-93 (2d Cir.
1971).
198 See, e.g., Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 221.
199 See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (stating that the Act is intended "to protect persons engaged in .. .
commerce against unfair competition"). To be sure, the Lanham Act also seeks to protect consumers from false advertising. See 5 J. THOMAS McCARTHY, McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION§ 27:31 (4th ed. 2014) (noting that"§ 43(a) was passed to protect consumers as well as competitors," and describing "commercial plaintiff[s]" as '"vicarious avenger[s]' of
consumer interests"). The courts' denial of standing to consumer plaintiffs reflects congressional
intent to exclude those plaintiffs.
200 Lexmark Int'!, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1391 (2014).
201 See, e.g., id. at 1393 (noting that "the classic Lanham Act false-advertising claim [is one]
in which one competitor directly injures another by making false statements about his own goods
or the competitor's goods and thus inducing consumers to switch" (internal quotation marks and
alterations omitted)); see also Famous Horse Inc. v. 5th Ave. Photo Inc., 624 F.3d 106, 113 (2d
Cir. 2010), abrogated in part on other grounds, Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. 1377.
202 See Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1393-95 (holding that competitor's supplier had standing to
bring false advertising claim).
203 See, e.g., Famous Horse, 624 F.3d at 113.
204 See, e.g., Johnson & Johnson v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 631 F.2d 186, 190 (2d Cir. 1980).
20s See Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Side at 20, Lexmark,
134 S. Ct. 1377 (No. 12-873) (citing Merck Eprova AG v. Brookstone Phann., LLC, 920 F. Supp.
2d 404 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), as an example).
206 See Famous Horse, 624 F.3d at 113.
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Together, these limitations seek to effectuate two prudential concerns. The first has to do primarily with congressional intent. When
courts ask whether a plaintiff's injury falls within the "zone of interests" created by a statute-or whether a plaintiff has experienced "antitrust injury" or "competitive injury" for purposes of the Lanham
Act-they are inquiring whether Congress intended for the courts to
intervene in the way they are being asked. 207 As the Supreme Court
has stated in the APA context, the question is whether "the plaintiff's
interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes
implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that congress intended to permit the suit. "208 Second, there are circumstances
in which it is appropriate for courts to consider the structure and function of litigation in determining who are proper plaintiffs.209
How do these considerations map onto patent validity challenges? Any assessment of the relevant zone of interests must begin
with the Patent Act. 210 Neither the Supreme Court nor the Federal
Circuit has defined the "zone of interests" created by the Patent Act
in those terms precisely. 211 But some well-understood principles point
the way. It is widely accepted that the purpose of the patent law is to
promote innovation. This purpose is reflected both in the constitu207 See Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1388-90; Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 400 (1987)
("[A]t bottom the reviewability question turns on congressional intent .. . .").
208 Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399.
209 Note, however, that courts' authority to consider matters of judicial prudence does not
extend so far as to enable courts to engage in free-wheeling policymaking concerning standing
requirements. See, e.g. , Holmes v. Sec. Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 289 (1992)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that concerns over the threat of nuisance litigation may be relevant but "are surely not alone enough to restrict standing to purchasers or sellers under a text
that contains no hint of such a limitation").
210 Unlike the antitrust or unfair competition laws, or the APA, the Patent Act does not
contain an express cause of action for persons seeking to challenge the scope or validity of a
patent. Section 281 provides only that " (a] patentee shall have remedy by civil action for infringement of his patent." 35 U.S.C. § 281 (2012). As described above, the Declaratory Judgment Act forms the basis for most present-day patent challenges, and the Patent Act's provisions
for judicial review of post-grant challenges in the PTO furnishes statutory authority for another
class of challenges. See infra Part I; 35 U.S.C. §§ 311(b), 321(b).
211 In Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920 (Fed. Cir. 1991), the Federal
Circuit rejected the idea that the zone of interests included a broad conception of " the public
good." Id. at 938 (internal quotation marks omitted). That is probably correct. Such a wide
zone of interests could swallow all of prudential standing, since arguably every statute that Congress passes purports to protect the public good. I part ways here with those scholars who seek
to expand standing to include citizen suits. See, e.g., La Belle, supra note 20; Amelia Smith
Rinehart, Patent Cases and Public Controversies, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 361 , 392-400 (2013).
The Supreme Court is also highly unlikely to sanction such suits given its hostility to statutory
citizen suit provisions expressed in Defenders of Wildlife and subsequent cases. See supra notes
179-80 and accompanying text; Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572-78 (1992).
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tional grant of authority to Congress to promulgate a patent act "[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts," 212 and in the text
and structure of the Patent Act itself. 213 Of course, "promoting innovation" is hardly self-defining. Innovation promotion could encompass a wide range of activities and a wide range of social goals, from
the production of new goods and services to the preservation of competition to the distribution of goods and services throughout the economy . 214 If nothing else, however, the promotion of innovation must
entail creating incentives to engage in the production of new and useful goods and services. That utilitarian goal is the classic justification
for the patent system, as recognized both by scholars215 and by the
courts.2 16 Equally well understood is that the patent system is limited,
again, as both a constitutional and a statutory matter. The statute is
thought to balance the incentives for invention provided by a grant of
exclusive rights with the "recognition that imitation and refinement
through imitation are ... necessary to invention itself and the very
lifeblood of a competitive economy."217
This suggests that the zone of interests surrounding the Patent
Act centers upon incentives to innovate. The Patent Act articulates
the bases for and conditions upon granting patents,218 enumerates the
rights that attach to a patent grant, 2 19 and provides for remedies that
patent holders may secure against infringers. 220 These provisions are
all the subjects of legislative and judicial change based on the extent
to which they promote or retard incentives to innovate. And, because
ensuring that the PTO issues only valid grants is important to innovation, Congress has provided mechanisms for parties to challenge the
validity of patents in the agency. 221 Christina Bohannon and Herbert
Hovenkamp fashion these well-understood purposes of the patent
U .S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
The Supreme Court consistently refers to this statutory purpose. See, e.g., Bonito Boats,
Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989).
214 See Brett Frischmann & Mark McKenna, Comparative Analysis of (Innovation) Failures
and Institutions in Context (Sept. 1, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with The George
Washington Law Review).
215 See, e.g., Peter S. Menell & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property Law, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAw AND EcoNoMrcs 1473, 1476 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007).
216 See, e.g. , Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116
(2013) (stating that "the very point of patents" is "to promote creation"); Mayo Collaborative
Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012).
217 Bonito Boats, 489 U .S. at 146; see also, e.g., Mayo , 132 S. Ct. at 1301-02.
218 35 u.s.c. §§ 101-112 (2012).
219 Id. § 154(d).
220 Id. §§ 271, 281-284.
221 See id. §§ 311-319; 321-329; Mata!, supra note 11 (legislative history).
212
213
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laws into a concept of "IP injury." 222 Their argument proceeds by
analogy to the concept of antitrust injury described above. Just as antitrust actions are limited to those which promote competition, notwithstanding the seemingly broad statutory standing for all persons to
challenge antitrust violations, so too, they argue, should actions to enforce patent rights be limited to those where the plaintiff can
"demonstr[ate] injury that is tied to the purpose for which the IP laws
were passed in the first place." 223 They argue that "IP law should recognize harm"-infringement-"only for uses that are likely to interfere with IP holders' decisions to create or distribute their worksthat is, only for harms that are consistent with the constitutional mandate that the purpose of the patent . . . system[ ] is to further
innovation. "224
Bohannon and Hovenkamp's theory of IP injury works just as
well in reverse. If the zone of interests protected by the patent law is
innovation incentives, then challengers to the scope or validity of patents have prudential standing if they allege harm to innovation incentives. To be sure, this concept is expansive. But it is not boundless. 225
It does not, for example, include broad notions of consumer welfare.
Unlike the antitrust laws, the Patent Act is not a consumer welfare
statute. 226 It does not aim to keep prices at competitive levels; to the
contrary, it aims to induce innovation through supracompetitive pricing. And the concerns that courts express about patent breadth or
scope are almost always framed in terms of the effect of patent
strength on innovation, not on prices. 227
The injury described in Part I fits squarely within this zone of
interests. Risk and uncertainty about the scope and validity of patents
directly affect the innovative process. Those who seek to develop or
market competing goods that may infringe are rationally "chilled" and
222 See CHRISTINA BOHANNON & HERBERT HoVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT: PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RlvALRY IN INNOVATION 50-55 (2012).
223

Id. at 51.

Id.; see also Paul R . Gugliuzza, IP Injury and the Institutions of Patent Law, 98 lowA L.
REV. 747, 751-53 (2013).
224

225 Cf Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 938 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (rejecting claim
that "the patent statute's 'zone of interests' encompasses any member of the public who perceives they will be harmed by an issued patent which they believe to be invalid").
226 Compare Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U .S. 477, 485-87 (1977), with
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989). See also Ritz Camera
& Image, LLC v. SanDisk Corp., 700 F.3d 503, 507--08 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
221

(2012).

See, e.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1303
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choose not to do so. 228 As described above, a definitive adjudication
of the scope or validity of a patent can clear the way for innovative ,
activity that might not otherwise take place. 229 If the patent is found ·
valid, then the parties can bargain toward an efficient license and innovation can proceed under the terms of the license.230 If it is invalid,
then the innovation can proceed unencumbered. Either way, removing the cloud of title for the party seeking to make unlicensed use is in
furtherance of the fundamental goal of the patent system, which is to
incentivize innovation. It therefore falls within the zone of interests of
the statute.
As to the second concern of prudential standing doctrine, which
attempts to avoid duplicative or wasteful litigation, allowing standing
for plaintiffs who allege the injury described above would generally
not pose a problem. Actions adjudicating the scope or validity of patents do not present the problems of duplicative recovery that antitrust
damage actions present. 231 Declaratory relief is equitable in nature. 232
Because there are no damages, there is no risk to the defendants of
duplicative awards and over-recoveries to the plaintiffs. This explains
why even in antitrust, prudential standing restrictions like the indirect
purchaser rule are relaxed when the plaintiff is seeking only injunctive
relief. 233 Jt also explains why standing under the Lanham Act tends to
be broader than antitrust standing. Most false advertising cases_seek
only injunctive relief. 234 To be sure, there may be situations in which
judicial economy concerns favor channeling declaratory relief to particular plaintiffs; I discuss those situations in the next section. But as a
general matter, there is no reason to think that a broadly restrictive
prudential standing rule is justified on the ground that it· is necessary
to prevent injustice. 235
228 See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
229 See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
230 Understanding, of course, that for a variety of reasons, licensing markets may be inefficient. See, e.g. , Mark A. Lemley & Nathan Myhrvold, How to Make a Patent Market, 36 HOFSTRA L. REv. 257, 257 (2007).
231 See Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U .S. 720, 730-32 (1977); AREEDA & HovENKAMP,
supra note 183, 'I 346c, at 165.
232 See BORCHARD, supra note 26, at 741.
233 See AREEDA & HoVENKAMP, supra note 183, 'I 346d, at 166 (" An equity suit neither
threatens duplicative recoveries nor requires complex tracing through the distribution chain.. . .
Illinois Brick has not therefore barred an indirect purchaser's suit for an injunction.").
234 See Mc CARTHY, supra note 199, § 27:37.
235 To the extent that the Federal Circuit appears concerned with (1) allowing patent holders to sit on their rights without having to worry about litigating to preserve the validity of their
grants; or (2) vexatious or harassing litigation against patent holders, neither of those concerns
justify narrow standing. As I describe in Part IV, infra, the former concern is not troubling as a
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These constitutional and prudential considerations suggest that
standing to challenge the scope or validity of patents ought to be significantly broader than the Federal Circuit currently allows. As described above, the Federal Circuit's "proximity" test effectively
precludes suit by any entities other than competitors. 236 And even
then, in order for a competitor to file suit, it has to be the target of
some action by the patentee sufficient to put it on notice of a likely
infringement suit. 237 By contrast, a focus on the injury that arises from
the existence of uncertain intellectual property yields a greater number of potential plaintiffs who may constitutionally bring suit, and prudential concerns support granting standing to most of them.
1.

Competitors, Potential Competitors, and Similar Actors

The injury described above is felt most directly by competitors in
the field. They are the ones whose activities are most likely to be
chilled by uncertain patents. Two important points distinguish competitor standing under the theory developed in this Article from the
Federal Circuit's current practice. First, the chilling effects of uncertain patents are independent of any actions that the patent holder may
take; that means that action by the patent holder is not required to
establish standing. Second, the chilling effects of uncertain patents
may be felt long before actual infringement becomes imminent. That
is because "quiet title" actions are best brought before fixed investments can be subjected to the threat of holdup. Together these considerations mean that not only competitors, but also potential and
indirect competitors have standing. In addition, academic or other
noncommercial actors might also be at risk and therefore entitled to
file suit to clear the fields in which they are working of adverse
patents.
Take Myriad as an example. The only plaintiff with standing in
that case was a doctor who (1) received a cease-and-desist letter from
the patent holder, and (2) alleged that he would immediately begin
using the claimed subject matter upon a judicial finding that the patent he challenged was invalid. 238 That case would come out differently
under the analysis that I propose. Physicians who might consider ofnormative matter, and the latter can be addressed through other less restrictive changes to the
litigation ecosystem.
236 See supra Part I.
237 See supra Part I.
238 See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 689 F.3d 1303, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2012), affd
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fering their own genetic testing services for the genes that are linked
with breast cancer face a risk of liability regardless of whether they
have actually been contacted by Myriad Genetics or not. And they
face a risk of liability not only if they would immediately be able to
infringe, but also if they would need time to plan their businesses or
facilities.
To be sure, a plaintiff must still show that her injury is "concrete
and particularized," that is, it "must affect the plaintiff in a personal
and individual way. " 239 Plaintiffs must demonstrate facts that support
their claim that a "quiet title" -like determination will actually remove
the cloud of uncertainty from their plans. These facts are likely to be
easier to demonstrate the closer a competitor is to launching an infringing product or service. But early stage competitors are by no
means excluded. Antitrust again provides a useful example. In that
area of the law, nascent firms may bring suit claiming that they would
have entered a market but for a defondant's anticompetitive conduct.
In such cases, courts consider a variety of factors including "the financial ability to enter the market, the background and experience that
makes success possible, and that [the firm] ha~ undertaken such significant steps toward entry as architectural plans or building commitments, contracts with prospective customers, or substantial marketing
expenditures." 240 Similarly, in the patent context, courts deciding
whether potential competitors legitimately have standing can consider
the extent and detail of their business plans, their existing commitments, and other such factors. The inquiry is not about the imminence
of infringement, but about the likelihood that the plaintiff actually is
chilled by uncertainty.
Neith~r do competitors need to be threatened directly by patent
holders. In a series of recent Federal Circuit cases, patent holders
sued their competitors' customers for infringement arising out of their
use of the competitors' products. When the competitors themselves
sought declaratory judgments that their products were not infringing-no doubt to protect their customers, at least in part-the Federal
Circuit held that the competitors had standing only if they could reasonably be accused of contributory infringement or inducement. 241
in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct.
2107 (2013).
239 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 & n.1 (1992).
240 AREEDA & HovENKAMP, supra note 183, 'l[ 349, at 227-28 (footn otes omitted).
241 See Microsoft Corp. v. DataTern, Inc., 755 F.3d 899, 903-04 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Cisco Sys.,
Inc. v. Alta. Telecomms. Research Ctr., 538 F. App'x 894, 897-98 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Arris Grp.,
Inc. v. British Telecomms. PLC, 639 F.3d 1368, 1375-77 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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Under the analysis proposed here, such a showing would be unnecessary. Competitors' economic activity is chilled not only by direct
threats, but also by indirect threats. No company would market a
product if customers were under constant threat of infringement for
using it. And the competitor is likely to be the more efficient litigator
in these circumstances; suits against customers rather than the supplier are likely patent holder gamesmanship.
2.

Consumers

Consumers usually will not experience the type of injury that
gives rise to standing under the analysis here. Consumers typically
purchase a protected product from a manufacturer. If the manufacturer is making the product under license, then the only possible basis
for the consumer's suit is that the consumer would pay less money for
the product in the absence of a patent. But that is not the risk described here. Nor is that alleged injury within the zone of interests
described above. Complaints about price are the province of the antitrust rather than the patent laws. Indeed, the Federal Circuit recently
drew a sharp distinction between the two. In Ritz Camera & Image,
LLC v. SanDisk Corp. ,242 the court declined to apply its restrictive
patent standing rules to the direct purchaser plaintiff's antitrust claim
based on Walker Process fraud. 243 That claim, that fraud on the PTO
resulted in the improper issuance of a patent that was then used to
anticompetitive effect, includes as one of its elements the need to
show that the patent was invalid. 244 The court wrote that "[a] Walker
Process antitrust c;laim is a separate cause of action from a patent declaratory judgment action" and is therefore "governed by principles of
antitrust law." 245
There may, however, be certain circumstances in which consumer
suits are appropriate. First, some consumers might engage in user innovation. 246 These consumers not only purchase goods, but alter them
and enga_~e in.. f~rther downstream innovation. 247 Those activities may
,.
Ritz Camera & Image, LLC v. SanDisk Corp., 700 F.3d 503 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
243 Id. at 507-08 (citing Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp. , 382
U.S. J72 (1965)).
244 Id. at 506.
245 Id. at 508.
246 See ERIC VON RIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION 19-32 (2005); William w. Fisher
III, The Implications for Law of User Innovation, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1417, 1418-30 (2010)
(describing a variety of user innovations); Katherine J. Strandburg, Users as Innovators: Implications for Patent Doctrine, 79 U . CoLo. L. REv. 467, 469 (2008) ("User innovators develop tech,nology for their own use, rather than to sell it.").
247 See VON RIPPEL, supra note ,246.
242
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be placed at risk because of uncertain intellectual property, and those
who engage in them may therefore have standing to remove that uncertainty. Second, if a consumer purchases a good that is infringing
and not under license, the consumer can be liable for infringement.
Most of the time, the patent holder will find it more economical to sue
a manufacturer than a large number of dispersed users. But suits
against consumers are not unheard of. 248 Consumers facing such suits
are facing regulation of their primary behavior. But so are the manufacturers, who, for the prudential reasons described above, are likely
to be the preferred plaintiffs. 249 When the preferred plaintiff does not
have adequate incentive to sue, however, consumers may be granted
standing instead. 250 That may occur, for example, when a consumer
can show that she has been threatened with litigation (a requirement
that a competitor would not have to meet) or that the relevant competitors for whatever reason have declined to sue.
3.

Interest Groups

Finally, interest groups that raise purely ideological objections to
particular patents are unlikely to have standing under the theory described here. They are not themselves the subjects of regulation
through patent enforcement and have no innovative activities to be
chilled by patent uncertainty.
Interest groups may, however, be able to sustain claims of associational standing. Under that doctrine, "an association has standing to
bring suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks
to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither
the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation
of individual members in the lawsuit." 251 Interest groups that represent firms or individuals who may be subject to risk and uncertainty from existing patents may therefore be able to sue as well.
248 See generally, e.g., Gaia Bernstein, The Rise of the End User in Patent Litigation, 55 B.C.
L. REv. 1443 (2014); Joe Mullin, Patent Trolls Want $1,000-For Using Scanners, ARs TECHNICA
(Jan. 2, 2013, 9:30 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/01/patent-trolls-want-1000-forusing-scanners/; see also supra note 241.
249

See supra Part III.B.

2so Cf AREEDA & HovENKAMP, supra note 183, 'I 348, at 202. In antitrust, where consumers are the preferred plaintiffs, competitors may have standing where consumers do not have
adequate incentives to sue. See id.
2s1

Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U .S. 333, 343 (1977).
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CONSISTENT

WITH SOUND POLICY

The previous Parts described how patents may injure those working in fields they occupy, even in the absence of enforcement efforts
by the patent holder, and argued that such injuries are sufficient for
standing purposes under current doctrine. That analysis yields a
broader concept of standing to challenge patent scope or validity than
the courts of appeals currently contemplate. This Part defends that
broader standing as a normative matter.

The Need for Patent Challenges

A.

Patents are generated in vast quantities in the United States. The
PTO now receives, for example, more than 560,000 utility patent applications every year and issues over 265,000 utility patents. 252 At that
volume, the PTO does not have the resources to examine every one of
them accurately. It is estimated, for example, that each patent examiner spends roughly eighteen hours examining each application. 253 In
these conditions, errors are inevitable. The PTO will necessarily issue
patents that do not meet the standards for eligibility and that should
not have been issued. Some empirical work in patents suggests that
such errors are frequent-between 33% and 46% of patents litigated
to judgment are found invalid.254 And even more commonly, the PTO
will issue patents with uncertain boundaries. 255
Invalid patents are socially costly. They are patents that should
not have been granted in the first instance. As such, their issuance is
in derogation of the background principle that those works ineligible
for protection under state or federal intellectual property laws are
presumptively available to the public. As the Supreme Court has explained, "[s]haring in the goodwill of an article unprotected by patent
or trade-mark is the exercise of a right possessed by all-and in the
free exercise of which the consuming public is deeply interested."256
Invalid intellectual property imposes social costs both when it is
enforced and when it is merely extant. 257 The classic justification for
See U .S. PATENT & TRADEMARK O FFICE, supra note 1, at 189 tbl.2, 192 tbl.6.
See DAN L. BURK & MARK A . LEMLEY, THE PATENT CR1s 1s AND Ho w THE CouRTS
CAN SOLVE h 23 & 172 n.10 (2009).
254 See supra note 72.
255 See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
256 Kellogg Co. v. Nat'! Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 122 (1938).
257 See generally Lemley, supra note 146, 1058-59 (describing five types of social costs of
intellectual property: static inefficiency, dynamic inefficiency, encouraging rent-seeking, administrative costs, and overinvestment in research and development).
252
253

2015]

RETHINKING STANDING IN PATENT CHALLENGES

539

intellectual property is that the costs of excluding others from practicing the subject of the intellectual property are outweighed by the benefits that come from encouraging innovation. 258 If an invention is not
eligible for patent protection, for example, it is thought that a patent is
not necessary to provide incentives to produce the invention. 259 That
implies that invalid IP imposes all of the social costs of exclusive rights
but confers none of the social benefits. And those social costs are
significant-exclusive rights not only restrict access and create deadweight losses when consumer demand cannot be satisfied at marginal
cost, but also impose significant restraints on further downstream
innovation. 260
As described above, however, invalid patents need not be enforced to remain socially harmful. Their mere existence can serve as a
powerful competitive deterrent, stifling the development of competitive markets and distorting innovative resources to less socially productive ends. 261 The proliferation of patents in itself poses challenges.
Multiple, potentially overlapping intellectual property rights give rise
to the risk of "patent thickets" that companies must work through in
order to commercialize products covered by multiple patents,262 and
"anticommons" scenarios in which multiple dispersed rights must be
aggregated in order to engage in innovative activity. 263
These costs are especially salient in light of the development of
new business models based on the assertion of intellectual property. I
refer here to the phenomena of patent "trolls." These are entities that
use patents primarily to obtain licensing fees or litigation settlements
rather than to support the development or transfer of technology. 264
See Menell & Scotchmer, supra note 215, at 1476-78, 1536-37.
See, e.g. , Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of Patentability, 120 YALE L.J. 1590, 1594 (2011).
260 The canonical statement of this problem can be found in Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic
Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention , in THE RATE AND D1REcrION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: EcoNOMIC AND SocIAL FACTORS 609, 619-20 (Nat'! Bureau of Econ. Research
ed., 1962); see also Menell & Scotchmer, supra note 215, at 1499-1500.
261 See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
262 See Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION Poucy AND THE EcoNOMY 119, 120-21 (Adam B. Jaffe et al.
eds., 2001).
263 See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 89, at 698. To be sure, empirical evidence about the
scale of the anticomrnons problem is mixed. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Noncompliance, Nonenforcement, Nonproblem? Rethinking the Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 45 Hous. L.
REv. 1059, 1061-62 (2008). I assume that this anticomrnons problem remains a threat that might
be alleviated by reducing the number of existing invalid patents.
264 There is no single definition of a "patent troll." I follow Colleen Chien's definition of
"patent assertion entities." See Chien, supra note 2, at 300.
258
259
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The patent troll business model takes advantage of the asymmetry of
costs between plaintiffs and defendants to extract nuisance settlements.265 Because these entities do not themselves practice any inventions or use any creative works that may be subject to counterclaims,
the cost of asserting their intellectual property is far lower than defendants' costs of defense. 266 Yet infringement judgments may subject
defendants to devastating losses-injunctive relief and very high damages multiples. As a result, many defendants choose to settle. 267
Trolls increase the social cost associated with invalid intellectual property. Because their business model depends less on success in court
than on the extraction of nuisance settlements, and because they
source most of their intellectual property from other parties that have
no interest in or ability to commercialize it, their assertions may be of
disproportionately invalid patents. 268
An exponential increase in the number of issued patents coupled
with increasing concerns about the behavior and social costs of patent
assertion entities has led to widespread calls to increase the "quality"
of issued patents-that is, to reduce the number of invalid patents and
their attendant social costs. 269 There are, broadly speaking, two ways
one can do this. The PTO can be more thorough in applying the criteria for patent validity during its initial examination. Or the agency
and courts can apply a light initial screen and then a deeper review in
litigation after the patent issues. Mark Lemley has argued that it
makes little sense to improve patent quality solely by increasing the
265 See Colleen Chien, Presentation at FfC-DOJ Joint Public Workshop on Patent Assertion Entity Activities: Patent Assertion Entities, 13-19 (Dec. 10, 2012), available at http://
ssm.com/abstract=2187314.
266 See id. at 19.
267 See id. at 13-19.
268 There are several sources of evidence to suggest that trolls press particularly weak IP
claims. Allison, Lemley, and Walker find that non-practicing entities (NPEs) who file multiple
lawsuits to enforce a single patent win only 9.2% of the cases that they litigate to judgment. See
John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & Joshua Walker, Patent Quality and Settlement Among Repeat Patent Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677, 691-95 & fig.4 & tbl.9 (2011). Nearly 70% of the mostlitigated patents in their study-most of which are held by NPEs-were found invalid. See id. at
706. Risch reports similar results for the most-litigated patents, but is skeptical about the connection between this finding and the asserting entity's status as a troll. See Michael Risch, Patent
Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REv. 457, 481-84 (2012). Finally, Chien reports based on survey
data that some 40% of startup companies targeted by patent trolls "stated that they were being
targeted because of their use of another's or a widely available technology." Colleen V. Chien,
Stanups and Patent Trolls, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REv. 461, 464-65 (2014).
269 See, e.g., R. Polk Wagner, Understanding Patent-Quality Mechanisms, 157 U. PA. L.
REv. 2135, 2136-37 & n.l (2009) (citing sources); id. at 2138-39 (defining patent quality as "the
capacity of a granted patent to meet ( or exceed) the statutory standards of patentability").
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resources expended in patent examination. 270 In brief, a large number
of patents are applied for and issue, but very few are ever the subject
of litigation or licensing. 271 In Lemley's view, the cost of more detailed examination to weed out bad patents is not justified because
few of those patents ultimately will be of any importance.272 Instead,
he argues that it is rational to apply a light screen at the examination
stage and then allow interested parties to devote the more significant
resources necessary for a detailed examination in litigation once it becomes clear which patents will be important and which will not. 273 Although this argument has its limits,274 its basic logic suggests at the
very least that the problem of invalid patents cannot be solved by administrative solutions alone, or even primarily. The costs of such a
solution will inevitably exceed its benefits.
The courts therefore have a critical role to play in screening out
invalid patents. Indeed, the courts are the ultimate arbiters of patent
validity (and scope). 275 Recognizing this role, the Supreme Court has,
on numerous occasions, "emphasized the importance to the public at
large of resolving questions of patent validity." 276 And it has "encourage[d] authoritative testing" of patent validity in court. 277 Importantly, the courts enjoy primacy in determinations of patent validity
notwithstanding Congress's enactment of procedures for administrative post-grant review. Those procedures-found in the America Invents Act278-aim to provide a less costly way to challenge the validity
270

See Lemley, Rational Ignorance, supra note 97, at 1497.

271

Id.

212

Id.

273

See id. at 1508-11.

274 Importantly, Lemley's argument is not an argument against any improvements to the
screening process. And, indeed, a number of proposals for reform make sense even accounting
for the "rational ignorance" that Lemley describes. See, e.g., Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law's Presumption of Validity , 60 STAN. L. REv. 45, 50 (2007) (proposing
heightened PTO review of certain patent applications).
275

See supra note 71-72 and accompanying text.

276

Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'!, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 100 (1993).

Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 344 (1971). The Court
has done so through a number of mechanisms. See Medimmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549
U.S. 118, 130-34 (2007) (licensee need not violate license to bring action for declaratory judgment of invalidity); Cardinal Chem., 508 U.S. at 100-01 (finding of noninfringement does not
moot counterclaims for invalidity); Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 346-48 (patent holder estopped
from re-litigating finding of invalidity); Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 663-68 (1969) (licensees not estopped from asserting invalidity of a patent as a defense in contract action for unpaid
royalties).
277

278

See 35 U.S.C. §§ 311, 321 (2012).
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of patents. 279 But because their results too can be appealed to the
federal courts,280 it is those courts that retain the final word.

B.

The Misalignment Between Current Standing Rules and
Incentives to Bring Patent Challenges

Most basically, expanded standing along the lines I describe in
Part III will promote more "authoritative testing" of patent scope and
validity. It stands to reason that if it is easier for plaintiffs to bring
invalidity cases, more such cases will be brought. Broader standing
can also discourage certain bad behaviors that have become common
among IP holders. One common tactic, for example, is for a patent
holder to threaten potential infringers in a way that falls just short of
the now malleable standard for declaratory judgment jurisdiction.281
That way the patent owner can induce behavioral changes yet shield
its patent from challenge.282 Similarly, some patent holders will file
suit and then, when it appears that their patent is legitimately
threatened, settle and make a unilateral covenant not to sue that may
moot any declaratory judgment counterclaim. 283 The risk-based
standing analysis proposed above reduces the effectiveness of this
gamesmanship. 284 No particular behavioral trigger controlled by the
patent holder is necessary for jurisdiction, and mooting a present infringement controversy generally would have no effect on an infringement defendant's standing to eliminate the risk that such a dispute
might arise again in the future. 285
This could also help alleviate the asymmetric structure of troll
litigation that contributes to nuisance settlements. 286 Broader standing would allow potential infringers to make credible threats of validity litigation even in the absence of direct threats from the troll. That
See Mata!, supra note 11.
See 35 U.S.C. § 319, 329 (2012).
281 See, e.g., Innovative Therapies, Inc. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 599 F.3d 1377, 1381 (Fed.
Cir. 2010).
282 See Leslie, supra note 84.
283 See, e.g., Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721 , 733-34 (2013) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Benitec Aust!., Ltd. v. Nucleonics, Inc., 495 F.3d 1340, 1351-52 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Dyk, J.,
dissenting).
284 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Lawrence S. Pope, Dethroning Lear? Incentives to
Innovate After Medlmmune, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 971 , 979-82 (2009).
285 The courts in Already, 133 S. Ct. at 728-29, and Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass'n v.
Monsanto Co., 718 F.3d 1350, 1357-58 (Fed. Cir. 2013), interpreted covenants not to sue and
statements clisclainiing intent to sue broadly enough to cover future conduct, thereby leaving
open the question whether covenants that are linlited to past or present conduct-the vast majority of such covenants-moot invalidity claims.
286 See supra notes 264-68 and accompanying text.
279

280
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in itself would serve as a check on troll behavior similar to the threat
of counterclaim suits for practicing entities. It would also, as described above, help to reduce trolls' ability to engage in strategic behaviors that allow them to simultaneously assert their patents and
shield them from challenge. 287
There is, however, a deeper reason why broader standing is justified. The current standing rules result in an underproduction of invalidity litigation. Even where sufficient incentives exist in plaintiffs that
can qualify under the current rules, the standing rules may distort the
types of patent challenges that the courts hear. This is because, as
described above,288 the current standing regime largely limits standing
to presently existing competitors. Those competitors are unlikely to
bring the most socially valuable validity challenges.
Several scholars have observed that the Supreme Court's decision
in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation,289 which gives findings of invalidity preclusive effect in subsequent litigation between different parties,290 makes invalidity litigation
a "public good," subject to familiar problems of underproduction. 291
In the typical case, a single challenger bears fhe full cost of the invalidity litigation. But the rule in Blonder-Tongue means that the challenger must share the fruits of her labors with the world. This creates
several problems. The first is free riding. Because the costs of challenging patents are borne singly but the benefits are spread globally,
parties who might be interested in such challenges have an incentive
to free ride on the efforts of others. 292 In other words, because patent
287 See supra notes 264-68 and accompanying text. It is worth noting that trolls engage in a
variety of legal strategies, which may be affected to varying degree by the possibility of easier
validity challenges. See Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the
Trolls, 113 CoLUM . L. REV. 2117, 2119-29 (2013) .
288 See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
289 Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
290 Id. at 333-34.
291 See Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents:
Why Litigation Won 't Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review
Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943, 951-55 (2004); Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to
Create a Better Patent System, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 763, 787-97 (2002); Joseph Scott Miller,
Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards for Defeating Patents, 19 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 667, 685-88 (2004); John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A
Proposal for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 305, 333-34.
292 See Miller, supra note 291 , at 687-88 ("Blonder-Tongue, considered alone, eliminates a
patent attacker's ability to exclude others from appropriating the benefit of its successful patent
attack. It thus turns patent invalidity judgments into public goods. And the resulting free rider
problem, which discourages patent challenges, is at least as stark as the one that justifies providing a patent system in the first place."); Thomas, supra note 291 , at 334 ("[A]mong [Blonder-
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challenges generate positive spillovers, we can expect to see fewer of
them than is optimal. 293
But the dynamics of patent challenges are even more pernicious.
The free rider problem described above is exacerbated by the fact that
those who would benefit from patent challenges are often competitors
of one another. A successful challenger therefore not only shares the
benefits of his challenge with the world at large, but more particularly
shares them with his competitors. This means not only that the collective action problem described above is that much harder to overcome,
but also that challengers may have an incentive to engage in collusive
settlement with patent holders. 294 Beyond a simple desire not to benefit competitors, it may be advantageous for one competitor armed
with a strong invalidity argument to strike a deal with the patent
holder. As Thomas writes, "[s]o long as sufficient supracompetitive
profits exist to go around, the patentee ordinarily possesses incentives
to suppress the prior art by means of a favorable license. Both parties
may then extract information rents from the consuming public by
maintaining artificially high prices due to an invalid patent. "295 Reverse payment settlements from branded drug manufacturers to generic drug manufacturers are a particularly salient example of this
problem. 296 In those cases, a generic manufacturer chooses to accept
payment to stay off the market rather than proceed with its challenge
to a patent covering a branded pharmaceutical product.297 This arrangement may be in both parties' interests-the branded manufacturer protects its patent and the challenger receives a large sum to
drop the challenge-but it is in derogation of the broader social interest in eliminating the potentially invalid pharmaceutical patent.
The existing literature suggests several ways to better align the
incentive of potential patent challengers with the socially optimal
Tongue's] drawbacks is that a potential opponent cannot appropriate the benefits of a successful
charge of patent invalidity to itself. In economic terms, the benefits of a successful charge of
patent invalidity become noiiexcludable.").
293 See Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 CouJM. L. REv. 257,
286-89 (2007) (describing spillovers problem in the context of copyright defenses); Gideon
Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Intellectual Property Defenses, 113 CoLUM. L. REV. 1483, 1487
(2013).
294 See Thomas, supra note 291, at 335-37.
295 Id. at 335; see also Dreyfuss, supra note 89, at 701--02 (noting that, contra to the Supreme Court's reasoning in Lear, licensees often have little incentive to challenge patents).
296 See FfC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2225 (2013); C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for
Delay: Pharmaceutical .Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U . L. REV.
1553, 1557-60 (2006).
297 See Hemphill, supra note 21~, at 1553.
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amount of challenges: bounties,298 fee shifting,299 and defensive costsharing.300 But there is another solution: broader standing. 301 The
challenges of collective and collusive action described above are most
severe with respect to competitors. Because the current standing rules
largely permit suit only by that class of challengers, there is a mismatch between the optimal incentives to challenge patents and the
justiciability rules governing who can bring such suits.
The standing principles described in Part III would authorize suit
by a variety of persons who face different incentives to challenge patents but who are currently precluded from doing so. These persons
include potential competitors, indirect competitors, and those who respond to nonpecuniary incentives. 302 Begin with potential competitors. There are reasons to believe that potential competitors may be
in a position to overcome the collective action problem described
above. Their cost-benefit calculus tends to focus more on investments
over time than on present competitive positioning. The relevant question for a potential competitor is whether the costs of challenging a
patent exceed the risk-adjusted costs of potential holdup by that patent after several years of costly investments. It may then be rational
to bear the full cost of litigation if it either saves the compa~y from
potential losses due to holdup or clears the way for investments over
time. The fact that others may free ride upon such efforts does not
enter that calculus. Free riding may be of less importance to potential
competitors for another reason. These competitors usually play in
nascent or underdeveloped markets where direct competition does
not yet exist. While it is true that their efforts to challenge patents
may benefit others who are developing the nascent market,303 that
298

See Miller, supra note 291, at 704-11 ; Thomas, supra note 291 , at 340-42.

299

See Kesan, supra note 291 , at 795-97.

300

See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 76, at 89-90.

301 The analyses above were all made during the time when the "reasonable apprehen.sion
of suit" test defined the limits of declaratory judgment jurisdiction and appear to assume this
restrictive test for standing as the baseline for determining who can bring suit. See, e.g., Farrell & .
Merges, supra note 291, at 946-47. Lemley & Shapiro do suggest "encourag[ing] public interest
organizations to challenge suspect patents," supra note 76, at 90, but do not link the feasibility of
this suggestion to standing rules.
302 See supra Part 111.C.
303 Abramowicz and Duffy have argued that there may be underproduction of new markets
when competitors can appropriate the information generated by the first experimenter. See
Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property for Market Experimentation, 83
N.Y.U. L. REv. 337, 367-369 (2008). In previous work, I have disputed that intellectual property
is necessary to solve that production problem. See Michael J. Burstein, Exchanging Information
Without Intellectual Property, 91 TEX. L. REV. 227, 240 (2012).
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benefit does not represent a direct and presently existing competitive
threat in the absence of well-defined products and markets.
Indirect competitors similarly may be less sensitive to free riding.
These are entities that do not compete in the same market as the
patentholder and therefore are unlikely themselves to be infringers. 304
Instead, they typically compete "upstream" as suppliers to direct infringers. That business model usually involves either licensing technology or facilitating the use of patented technology by others. 305
Their revenues are dependent not upon their own exploitation of patented technology, but on the widespread exploitation of that technology by others. 306 They should therefore be relatively indifferent toand indeed, supportive of-widespread adoption of the patented technology should they be successful in their suit. Indeed, collusion with
the patent holder to limit the spread of the technology is unlikely to
be in their interest.
Finally, there is a class of plaintiffs whose incentives to bring suit
are not limited to pecuniary interests. Among this class are public
interest groups like the Public Patent Foundation or the Electronic
Frontier Foundation and the test plaintiffs they recruit such as nonprofit or academic researchers or technologists. Academic researchers, for example, may be motivated by a desire to spread the benefits
of scientific research more widely and this motivation may trump financial motivations to exploit the technology for monetary gain. 307
Because these plaintiffs see it as part of their mission to encourage
widespread dissemination of technology, they are willing to expend
the funds and share the benefits broadly. Indeed, to these plaintiffs,
free riding is a feature rather than a bug.
Of course, patent challenges do happen even under existing rules,
and potential challengers do have some incentive to bring suit, though
perhaps with less frequency than optimal. 308 But even where the in304 Cf Matthews Int'! Corp. v. Biosafe Eng'g, LLC, 695 F.3d 1322, 1328-31 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(holding that indirect competitor lacked standing).
305 See id. at 1330.
306 See id.
307 See, e.g. , Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and
the Norms of Science, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 77, 88-94 (1999) (describing traditional norms of sharing in scientific communities). This view is necessarily a simplification. See, e.g. , Peter Lee,
Patents and the University, 63 DUKE L.J. 1, 35-38 (2013). I do not mean to argue that all academics experience these incentives, but rather that enough do that a legal change granting
broader standing would likely result in more challenges brought by those who have incentive to
do so.
308 See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 76, at 89 (concluding that the incentive to challenge
invalid IP depends on a myriad of fact-specific circumstances).
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centive exists to challenge patents, there is a further under-explored
problem. The precise nature of the challenge will of course depend on
the challenger's interests. Competitors' interests may again diverge
from the social optimum. There are a number of different ways to
contest the validity of any given patent. Some are specific to the patent itself. A claim that the patent fails the requirements of novelty
and nonobviousness usually has this structure. It is a claim based on
specific facts about whether the subject matter claimed in the patent
existed in the world prior to invention or application or whether the
subject matter of the patent would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art. But other defenses operate more categorically. A claim that a patent falls outside of eligible subject matter, for
example, purports to exclude from patentability certain content altogether. Take the example of human gene patents. A patent-specific
claim of invalidity, say, that the patent is not novel, is a claim that
someone else had previously discovered the particular gene. 309 By
contrast, an argument that the patent does not claim eligible subject
matter is an argument that genes are not patentable. 310 That latter
argument affects far more than the single patent; it potentially has the
effect of invalidating a large number of issued patents. 311
Now consider who has an incentive to bring a particular kind of
challenge. Competitors are likely to bring only patent-specific challenges. Any challenge that sweeps more broadly likely impacts their
intellectual property as well. So a competitor challenging a gene patent will argue that that patent is invalid, but not that genes as a category are unpatentable. If he owns similar patents, then that latter
argument will redound to his detriment. 312 This phenomenon may explain why the question whether genes constitute patentable subject
matter remained unresolved for almost thirty years after the PTO began issuing such patents. 313 The current standing rules, by limiting
standing for the most part to competitors, distort the development of
309 See 35 U .S.C. § 102(a) (2012). I am over-simplifying here. The more specific argument
is that the subject matter of the claim existed in the prior art at the date of application.
310 See id. § 101; Ass 'n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012),
affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133
S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
311 See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1347-48 (Moore, J ., concurring in part).
312 See Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 293, at 1512-14 (noting that class and general
defenses may suffer from underproduction relative to individualized defenses because they are
accompanied by significant spillovers).
313 See A ss'n for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1343-44 (Moore, J., concurring in part).
The Supreme Court resolved the issue on appeal-it held that genes were not patentable. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 2107 at 2117.
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the substantive law of patents. By limiting standing to a particular
class of plaintiffs, they encourage challenges based on arguments that
are in those plaintiffs' interests, rather than based on the full spectrum
of validity issues that any given patent may present.
Broader standing along the lines described in this article could
help solve that more specific under-production problem. Just as those
plaintiffs other than direct competitors may have more incentive to
bring patent challenges in the first place, so too may they have incentive to bring a-wider range of challenges. Potential and indirect competitors often operate in markets adjacent to the intellectual property
they are challenging. They are therefore less likely to shy away from
broader challenges to that intellectual property. Similarly, those motivated by nonpecuniary concerns are likely to be relatively uninhibited
in the scope of challenges that they bring.
C.

Mitigating the Potential Costs of Expanded Standing

Of course, broader standing is not costless. It encourages more
litigation. The costs of that litigation will be borne primarily by patent
holders who need to defend against cases that they otherwise could
avoid. This section briefly explains why those increased costs likely do
not outweigh the benefits described above.
Broader standing increases the possibility that a patent holder
may have to incur costs to defend her patent in an administrative action or a lawsuit. One objection to broader standing, then, is that a
patent holder should not have to bear such costs. There are two ways
to conceptualize this objection. The first is to argue that once a patent
has issued, a patent holder that chooses not to enforce it for whatever
reason should not be compelled to defend it in court. This formulation of the objection, however, assumes that unenforced intellectual
property is harmless. As described above, that assumption is not justified. 314 It also reflects a view that patent holders should be left alone
once \their IP has issued. But patents are only presumed to be valid
when they 'issue. They are not actually valid until they are tested in
court. 315 And Congress, by providing for administrative review after
grant, has· at least indicated that patent owners must be prepared to
defend their exclusive rights upon application by a third party. 316
There is no reason why the expectation should be any different with
314
315
316

See supra Part II.
See supra note 4.
See 35 U.S.C. §,§ 311(a)-(b), 321(a)-(b) (2012).
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respect to actions brought initially or subsequently to administrative
review in the federal courts.
A different formulation of the objection posits that patent applicants will have to factor the possibility of incurring post-grant litigation costs into their decision whether to obtain the IP in the first
instance. Broader standing in this view makes it more expensive on
average to obtain a grant of exclusive rights. 317 It is far from clear,
however, that increasing the expense of intellectual property results in
a social welfare loss. At the margin, it is likely to result in fewer issued patents. But as David Fagundes and Jonathan Masur write, the
costly nature of the patent acquisition process is a "classic costly
screen." 318 The cost of acquisition "forc[es] actors who seek to acquire
legal rights to consider whether acquisition of the right will be worth
the cost of doing so. " 319 With respect to patents, there is reason to
believe that the effect of the costly screen is to deter the production of
low private value rights that also have low social value. 320 The argument is that because the PTO employs only a rough screen, as described above, 321 it is highly likely that patents of low social value will
issue-that is, patents whose mere existence imposes costs but whose
issuance is unaccompanied by a significant social benefit because they
are invalid. Imposing a cost deters applicants whose private valuation
of the patent does not meet the cost threshold. It is then highly likely
that patents of low private value also have low social value, so this
cost is socially beneficial.
It is of course difficult to determine the optimal cost of the
screen, and therefore difficult to say with certainty that increasing the
cost of obtaining a patent by making it more likely the holder will
have to defend that patent in a su~sequent proceeding will confer a
social benefit. But there is reason to believe it is so. Consider, for
example, that the cost of patenting has remained roughly similar for
the last several years even as the volume of patent applications has
skyrocketed. 322 Meanwhile, the problems associated with low social
317 Justice Harlan, concurring in Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery &
Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965), expressed concern that validity challenges might "chill"
patenting activity. Id. at 180 (Harlan, J., concurring). That case, however, involved the threat of
treble damages in an antitrust suit. Suits or administrative actions seeking a declaration of invalidity do not subject patent holders to such damages.
318 David Fagundes & Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Intellectual Property, 65 VAND. L. REv.
677, 680 (2012).
319 Id. at 679-80.
320 See id. at 696-700.
321 See supra notes 252-54 and accompanying text.
322 See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 1, at 189 tbl.2 (total patent applica-
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value patents, like patent trolls in the software and telecom industries,
have gained increasing public salience. 323 This suggests that additional
deterrence may be socially valuable.
Aside from imposing costs on patent holders, which may do more
good than harm, there is a different and more concerning problem
that arises from the operation of Blonder-Tongue's preclusion rule.
Recall that Blonder-Tongue gives judgments of invalidity preclusive
effect in subsequent litigation between different parties. 324 It does not
extend that preclusion, however, to judgments of validity. 325 This
asymmetry means that a patent holder must defend against every
claim of invalidity. If she loses only once, her patent is invalid. But
challengers can bring actions repeatedly. This rule therefore presents
a real threat of vexatious or harassing litigation. Broader standing
may increase this risk to patent holders.
There are several mechanisms, however, that can help to mitigate
this risk. One is simply the cost of litigation. Patent challenges are
expensive for both plaintiffs and defendant-s. Plaintiffs in such cases
can obtain a declaration that the patent in question is invalid or not
infringed, but cannot collect damages or attorneys' fees. The nuisance
value of such suits is therefore limited. 326 For the most part, we can
expect such suits to be legitimate because plaintiffs will not be incentivized to bring the suit for a reason other than actual invalidation of
the intellectual property.
But suppose that cost is no issue. Say that a large corporation
decides to set up a $1 billion fund to attack any and all software patents that it can find. Again, as to meritorious suits, there are reasons
to think that the cost to patent holders is justified, as described above.
Repeated or harassing litigation enabled by this structure, however,
represents a real danger. I offer both a set of modest solutions based
tions filed more than doubled between 1999 and 2013); Fagundes & Masur, supra note 318, at
689-90 & nn.38-39.
323 See supra note 2.
324 See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found , 402 U.S. 313, 333-34 (1971) .
325 See 6A DONALD s. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS§ 19.02[2][e], at 19-112 (2013). The
same is true of judgments of noninfringement in cases that pose different fact -specific questions
among the various potential plaintiffs.
326 One potential exception may be in the context of licensing negotiations, where a credible threat to initiate invalidity proceedings could give a potential licensee significant leverage.
See Dreyfuss & Pope, supra note 284, at 984-91; SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480
F.3d 1372, 1383-85 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Bryson, J., concurring in the result). One solution to this
problem, which Dreyfuss & Pope advocate, is reconsideration of the doctrine of licensee estoppel. See Dreyfuss & Pope, supra note 284, at 1006. This is a more tailored solution to a particular problem of incentives to innovate than is a blanket restriction on standing.
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on the application of existing preclusion law and discretionary limits
on jurisdiction and a more radical solution to redirect validity litigation away from patent holders and toward the government.
Ordinary preclusion principles are likely to prevent repeated litigation. Although Blonder-Tongue establishes an asymmetry between
findings of validity and invalidity as a matter of issue preclusion, principles of claim preclusion continue to bar subsequent suits by the same
parties. 327 A challenger who is unsuccessful in asserting a claim of invalidity cannot simply assert the same claim against the same patent
holder in a different forum, even if the precise grounds for challenge
are different or there has been an intervening change of law in between the suits. 328 It is also worth noting in this context that Congress
has designed post-grant review proceedings with these principles in
mind.329
Claim preclusion does not, of course, bind different parties. A
subsequent challenger can still bring a substantially identical suit, forcing the patent holder to litigate multiple proceedings. A solution to
this problem might be to soften or eliminate the asymmetry that
Blonder-Tongue creates. Many courts have recognized the potential
unfairness to patent holders that results from having to relitigate
"wins" but not "losses" and therefore grant some weight to previous
judgments of validity under principles of comity. 330 The danger in extending full preclusive effect to judgments of validity is that it may not
be the case that a single plaintiff has an interest in bringing every possible challenge to a particular patent. 331 So a finding in one litigation
that a patent is valid likely should not bar subsequent challenges on
different grounds by different parties who could not litigate their
claims in the first action. A useful middle ground would be to grant
issue preclusive effect in subsequent cases that raise the same grounds
for or turn on the same evidence of invalidity as a previous case.
327 See Roche Palo Alto LLC v. Apotex, Inc., 531 F.3d 1372, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
("[C]laim preclusion applies where: ' (l) the same parties, or their privies, were involved in the
prior litigation, (2) the prior litigation involved the same claim or cause of action as the later suit,
and (3) the prior litigation was terminated by a final judgment on the merits." (quoting Cent.
Delta Water Agency v. United States, 306 F.3d 938, 952 (9th Cir. 2002))).
328 See id. at 1380-81 (holding that subsequent counterclaim of invalidity was barred by
claim preclusion where parties litigated previous claim arising out of same operative facts).
329 Under the new procedures in the America Invents Act, for example, a petitioner before
the agency may not bring a subsequent petition for review "on any ground that the petitioner
raised or reasonably could have raised during that post-grant review." 35 U.S.C. § 325(e)(l)
(2012). That principle applies as well to subsequent actions brought in court. See id. § 325(e)(2).
330 See 6A Ctt1suM, supra note 325, § 19.02[2][e], at 19-112-19 (collecting cases).
331 See supra note 308 and accompanying text.
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The courts also have a variety of discretionary mechanisms that
they can use to screen out cases that appear to be particularly vexatious. The ripeness doctrine, for example, provides courts with a
means to delay adjudication until particular issues become more focused between the parties, and could be used in this context to screen
out particularly attenuated claims of injury that nonetheless meet the
Article III and prudential standing bars described above. The federal
courts also have broad discretion under the Declaratory Judgment Act
to decline to hear a suit seeking declaratory relief. 332 These prudential
or discretionary mechanisms are flexible. They operate for the most
part on a case-by-case basis. They allow courts, therefore, selectively
to deny access to the court for a variety of reasons without erecting a
firm doctrinal barrier. Judicious application of these doctrines can
likely prevent abuses by validity challengers while at the same time
allowing for the benefits of broad standing described above.
A more radical solution to the problem of vexatious litigation
against patent holders would be to redirect validity litigation away
from private parties and toward the government. In a sense the existing administrative review procedures are an attempt to encourage
this. In those procedures, the PTO is the defendant and incurs the
litigation cost. The AIA procedures even go so far as to preclude a
petitioner electing administrative review from bringing the same
claims against a private party in court. 333 But the Federal Circuit has
been reluctant to apply ordinary principles of administrative review to
patent challenges. 334 It may be time to reconsider that position. To
the extent that a patent challenge is fundamentally an argument that
the PTO acted wrongly when it issued the patent, the agency is the
more natural defendant. The PTO can defend its ruling according to
ordinary principles of administrative review; the patent holder can intervene if necessary to develop additional facts. Symmetry between
infringement litigation and challenger-initiated validity litigation
could be achieved through mandatory joinder of the PTO or the use
of something akin to a primary jurisdiction referral to give the PTO
332 See Medimmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 136 (2007) ("The Declaratory
Judgment Act provides that a court 'may declare the rights and other legal relations of any
interested party,' not that it must do so." (citation omitted) .(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a))).
333 See 35 U.S.C. § 325(a)(2) (providing for automatic stay of subsequently-filed civil action); id. § 325(e)(2) (precluding subsequent civil suits for same claim of invalidity).
334 See, e.g., Pregis Corp. v. Kappos, 700 F.3d 1348, 1357-61 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (holding that
review of PTO validity determinations under the Administrative Procedure Act is precluded by
the Patent Act).
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the first opportunity to defend its action. 335 Putting the burden of validity defense on the agency that issues the intellectual property also
can help solve a particular asymmetry in the law that encourages patent grants rather than denials. Because the PTO currently receives
greater scrutiny for its denials than its grants, it is incentivized to grant
more and to take an expansive view of the law. 336 Requiring administrative defense of patent validity may simultaneously relieve this problem and reduce the burden on patent holders described above.
CONCLUSION

"Patent standing" is just standing. There is no justification for
treating patent standing differently from any other justicj_ability problem. And the application of traditional standing principles to patent
challenges yields a broader concept of standing than the courts addressing .the issue currently contemplate. The injury in such cases is
the risk and uncertainty that patents create for others working in the
same field. When those other market participants are deterred from
engaging in innovative activity-when they rationally choose to
forego making costly investments before resolving the uncertaintythey have standing to bring what amounts to a quiet title action. They
can clear the field of the adverse patent before making those investments. And this result is consistent with sound policy-it supports the
innovation-promoting goals of the patent laws while avoiding the ills
that standing doctrine is supposed to prevent. Broader standing
should help to rein in some of the abuses of the patent system that
have become increasingly prevalent in recent years. It will contribute
to more meaningful public participation in developing patent policy.
And it will help to ensure that patents serve not just private interests
but those of the public more broadly.

335 . See John F. Duffy, On Improving the Legal Process of Claim Interpretation: Administrative Alternatives, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & PoL'Y 109, 136-48 (2000) (arguing for use of primary jurisdiction referrals from courts to the agency in patent cases).
336 See Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470, 503 (2011); Melissa F. Wasserman, The PTO 's Asymmetric Incentives: Pressure to Expand Substantive Patent Law, 72 OHIO
ST. L.J. 379, 401 (2011).

